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Abstract 
Firms in the cloud-computing era are facing the critical issue of integrating on-premises software 
and cloud-based software services. To date, the software industry has designed two different types 
of integration methods—an enterprise service bus (ESB) and an integration platform as a service 
(iPaaS). However, there are conflicting views on when and how to use these different integration 
methods to fulfill integration needs. This study aims to resolve this confusion through economic 
modeling. By focusing on the indirect network effect and following a two-product bundling 
framework, we establish a stylized model to investigate optimal pricing and bundling decisions and 
the best integration choice. Our findings contradict common perceptions that an iPaaS is the better 
choice for integration and show that firms can derive higher value by adopting ESB to integrate on-
premises software and cloud-based software services. Conceptually, given that the overall network 
value received from a cloud-based software service is higher, the use of ESB can contribute toward 
significantly improving the total value of the two software applications. We also find that unbundling 
is the best marketing strategy for firms because software integration can improve the valuation of 
individual software. Our findings have important implications for software vendors. They suggest 
that vendors can leverage a higher network value from the software service by integrating it with on-
premises software applications through ESB rather than iPaaS and eventually realize higher profits 
by extracting more value from consumers. Since integration increases the value of individual 
products, vendors should sell them separately instead of offering them as a bundle. 
Keywords: Integration, Enterprise Service Bus, Integration Platform as a Service, Network Effect, 
Indirect Network Effect, Cloud Computing, Bundling 
Kenny Cheng was the accepting senior editor. This research article was submitted on December 16, 2018 and 
underwent three revisions. 
1 Introduction 
Given the digitization of business processes, the 
seamless integration of different software applications 
has become a critical requirement of firms. However, 
the prevalent problem of incompatible data formats 
(such as data types, file formats, transmission 
protocols, and runtime process management), known 
as the information silo problem in the software 
industry, complicates this process (Vayghan et al., 
2007; Miller & Tucker, 2014). To overcome this 
problem, companies apply different software 
integration methods. For example, message-oriented 
middleware, such as IBM’s messaging queue (MQ) 
series and Microsoft message queuing (MSMQ) for the 
one-way exchange of data (Datz, 2012) are aimed at 
addressing this problem (Summers, 2013). 
Currently, there are two main types of integration 
methods—enterprise service bus (ESB) and 
integration platform as a service (iPaaS). An example 
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of ESB is SAP’s on-premises integration solution 
process orchestration (PO), which mainly integrates 
different on-premises software applications while 
facilitating application-to-application (A2A) and 
business-to-business (B2B) integration. An example of 
iPaaS is SAP’s cloud-integration solution SCP-
Integration (Nair, 2017), which offers connectivity to 
varied systems and primarily integrates different 
cloud-based software services.  
Traditionally, ESB systems provide a layer of 
middleware across various on-premises applications. 
This middleware layer serves as the communication 
bus between applications, orchestrating interaction 
between each application and the bus (Mulesoft, 
2018b). In fact, ESB systems have their roots in 
service-oriented architectures (SOAs) (Wikipedia, 
2018a) and can be understood as a platform on which 
an SOA is realized.1 ESB can effectively rescue firms 
from the low scalability problem encountered with the 
electronic data interface (EDI), which has been used to 
connect software applications (Mulesoft, 2018b). 
Some examples of ESBs include the Oracle Enterprise 
Service Bus, SAP Process Integration, and the IBM 
Integration ESB (Wikipedia, 2018a). 
However, in the cloud-computing era, the data 
associated with different software services usually 
reside on different cloud servers. As more enterprises 
move toward cloud services, owing to the significant 
difference between software architecture and 
implementation, firms using on-premises systems face 
the challenge of integrating on-premises software and 
cloud services. This increased use of cloud services has 
turned the information silo problem into a cloud silo 
problem. iPaaS is designed to resolve this problem by 
allowing the integration between cloud-based and on-
premises software. iPaaS is a cloud-integration 
platform service that not only offers connectivity with 
cloud services but also provides a secure method of 
accessing on-premises software (Mulesoft, 2018a). 
iPaaS provides prebuilt connectors, business rules, 
maps, and transformations facilitating integration 
flows and application-programming interface 
management (Rouse, 2017b).  
However, ESB and iPaaS are fundamentally very 
different integration architectures. To illustrate this 
difference, Table 1 summarizes the advantages and 
drawbacks of iPaaS and ESB. iPaaS is specifically 
designed for lightweight messaging and document 
standards (i.e., representational state transfer and 
JavaScript object notation) and is suitable for real-time 
 
1  https://www.differencebetween.com/difference-between-
soa-and-vs-esb/ 
2  iPaaS cannot integrate complex on-premises software 
applications effectively and it is not effective in providing 
low-latency data throughput between applications (Butler, 
2016). Technically, this lower integration efficiency problem 
applications in cloud applications. In contrast, ESB can 
perform more complex integration and is thus more 
suitable for the integration of on-premises software 
and legacy systems. 
Significant efforts have been made to overcome 
architectural differences (Razza, 2017; Mulesoft, 2018b). 
Some iPaaS solutions can support on-premises systems, 
while some ESB solutions introduce features that enable 
integration with cloud services. However, owing to their 
significant architectural differences, it is difficult for iPaaS 
to achieve the same integration efficiency between its use 
for on-premises software integration (low efficiency) and 
its use for cloud software services integration (high 
efficiency). Similar limitations exist for ESB. 2  The 
existence of two different, major software-integration 
architectures presents a dilemma to software vendors 
(Stafford, 2013). Specifically, the questions about when 
and how to use iPaaS versus ESB are contested (Rouse, 
2017a). However, the current discussions are mainly 
related to the technology perspective and few studies have 
examined the question from the angle of economic 
incentives.  
From the economics perspective, there is a similarity 
between the problem of competing integration 
architectures and that of competing software standards, 
in which network effects are critical (Katz & Shapiro, 
1985, 1992; Gandal, 1995). The extant literature has 
conceptualized the indirect network effects from the 
perspectives of either compatible software 
(Bonaccorsi, Giannangeli & Rossi, 2006) or IT 
standards (Zhao & Xia, 2014). Contrary to the 
abovementioned literature, this study considers the 
indirect network effects that emerge because of an 
integration between on-premises software and cloud-
based software services. 
Conceptually, the integration methods serve as bridges 
in order to help users derive an additional indirect 
benefit from the other software connected to the 
bridges (Mulesoft, 2018a; Wikipedia, 2018a), and such 
software integration is critical to the realization of the 
stated indirect network effect. For instance, SAP’s 
process orchestration can facilitate a connectivity 
between business process management (BPM) and 
business rules management (BRM), thereby enabling 
BPM users to gain the utilities from BRM indirectly in 
order to respond to changes and make smart decisions 
and vice versa. It would be impossible to derive this 
indirect network value in the absence of such 
integration tools.  
could be understood as one caused by iPaaS owing to its fit 
with cloud-based software services, its fewer adapters, data 
transformers, protocol converters, and routers, among other 
issues, as well as the significant difference between the two 
software modes. 
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Table 1. Comparison between ESB and iPaaS 
 ESB iPaaS 
Best integration On-premises software Cloud-based software service 
Level of 
complexity of 
integration 
More complex Less complex 
Scalability 
Vertical scalability: 
integration between an 
enterprise’s complex 
internal systems and 
architectures 
Horizontal scalability: integration with third parties, partners, and other 
software-as-a-service (SaaS) solutions 
Multitenant 
Does not support 
multitenanting 
Supports multitenanting 
SaaS 
integration 
Does not support ad hoc 
integration 
Supports ad hoc integration 
IoT integration 
Unsuitable for IoT 
integration 
Suitable for IoT integration 
This article aims to understand how firms can make the 
right integration decision when dealing with two 
competing integration methods. The presence of an 
indirect network effect, consequently, affects how 
vendors price their software applications, and therefore 
significantly affects the demands of software products 
and services. This situation presents an interesting and 
important dilemma to vendors in terms of which 
integration method they should embrace. Although 
many researchers have examined the optimal bundling 
strategies for technology products with the network 
effect (Prasad, Venkatesh & Mahajan, 2010; Pang & 
Etzion, 2012), few studies have conducted an 
examination by considering software integration, 
which is the critical issue faced by the software 
vendors.  
In particular, we consider the integration effect of two 
commonly used integration methods—ESB and 
iPaaS—and the associated indirect network effects. 
Although ESB (or iPaaS) is designed to integrate 
cloud-based software service (or on-premises 
software), it achieves integration with lower efficiency. 
Integration enables users of one software application 
to gain an indirect network value from another 
software application, that is, an indirect network effect. 
For example, owing to the improved reachability 
offered by process orchestration, the users of BPM can 
indirectly gain network value from BRM.  
In our model, the software product has zero marginal 
costs (Kluis, 2016), but the platform for software service 
incurs a positive infrastructure cost (Marston et al., 2011; 
Feng, Jiang & Liu, 2018; Guo & Ma, 2018). In a general 
scenario, the on-premises software and the cloud-based 
software service are independently valued.3 The software 
vendor needs to make the right product bundling 
decision—pure component (PC), pure bundling (PB), or 
mixed bundling (MB)—in the presence of both direct and 
indirect network effects. In the baseline case, the on-
premises and cloud-based software services do not share 
a relationship (Model 1). Hence, we relax this assumption 
by introducing the fixed integration effect 4 and compare 
the decisions and outcomes of the software vendor under 
iPaaS and ESB (Model 2 and Model 3). Figure 1 
conceptualizes the research context of this article.5 
Second, either through ESB or iPaaS, if the software 
product and service are highly integrated, and this 
integration can create a higher indirect network effect, 
then unbundling can be considered an optimal strategy.
 
3  The product complementarity/substitutability effect, in 
which the joint use of the two software products will create 
synergistic value or one may replace the other in use, is 
mainly related to the software products/services. We do not 
consider the complementarity/substitutability effect for the 
following two reasons: (1) the two-product bundling 
problem is complex in nature, especially when considering 
both direct and indirect network effects, and (2) the effect of 
product complementarity/substitutability on product 
bundling decisions has been analyzed in detail in existing 
literature (Venkatesh & Kamakura, 2003). 
4  For ESB or iPaaS, vendors design and implement the 
integration tool considering the architectures and modes of 
software applications to be integrated. Thus, vendors lack the 
freedom to configure the integration. 
5 For instance, by using iPaaS, users of SAP-based software 
and non-SAP systems can effectively collaborate (Brian, 
2013; Kanaracus, 2013). The IBM Integration Bus, the ESB 
offered by IBM, can improve the reachability and the value 
of the connected software/service by providing a 
communication channel between them in a SOA (Wikipedia, 
2018b). The integration would have been more difficult 
without iPaaS/ESB, which provides the centralized 
integration tools to connect incompatible data and 
commands for the different software and creates an indirect 
network effect referenced in the literature (Rochet & Tirole, 
2006; Corts & Lederman, 2009). 
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Figure 1. Research Context 
Through the lens of economic modeling, our article 
generated some interesting findings. First, unlike 
previous literature that portrays MB as the optimal 
strategy (McAfee, McMillan & Whinston, 1989), we 
find that vendors can perform more effectively using 
MB only when their network effects are relatively low 
and their software products and services are not 
integrated. This outcome occurs because, when the 
network effect is strong, more consumers achieve a 
higher aggregate utility when consuming the two 
products; hence, PB can best allow the software vendor 
to extract value from consumers. This observation may 
explain why SAP bundles sales, marketing, and 
customer service software as a suite of solutions 
(PYMNTS, 2018). 
This effect emerges when integration allows an 
individually purchased product to derive additional 
utility from the other product connected to the 
integration tool. In such a case, the preferred strategy 
for vendors will be to promote two individual products 
through different channels rather than selling them as 
a bundle. Such a phenomenon has been observed in the 
software industry; for example, SAP offers multiple 
types of integration solutions—that is, integratable 
software solutions are offered as individual products 
and not in a special package (Nair, 2017).  
Third, our results show that when integrating on-
premises and cloud-based software, vendors can 
realize higher profits by using ESB than by using iPaaS 
(under the same integration level). The underlying 
rationale is that, given that the network value of 
software services is higher than that of software 
products, the vendor can allow software-product users 
to gain network value indirectly from software services, 
eventually improving the overall network value for all 
consumers (users of on-premises software products 
and cloud-based software services). Under such a 
scenario, vendors can extract a higher value from 
consumers and thus derive higher profit. This result 
presents an argument against the common perception 
of iPaaS as a better integration method in the cloud-
computing era. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
The related literature is presented in the next section. 
Section 3 lays out the modeling framework and its 
intuition. The results and analysis are presented in 
Section 4. Model relaxation and associated results are 
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes this paper 
with managerial insights, limitations, and future 
research avenues. 
2 Literature Review 
This research is closely related to the following 
literature on product bundling, network effects, and 
product compatibility. 
2.1 Product Bundling  
Product bundling has received considerable attention 
from scholars in various domains, such as economics 
(Adams & Yellen, 1976; Schmalensee, 1984), 
marketing (Venkatesh & Mahajan, 2009; Prasad et al., 
2010), and information systems (Bakos & 
Brynjolfsson, 1999; Pang & Etzion, 2012; Etzion & 
Pang, 2014). In the field of information systems, 
product bundling has been investigated from various 
perspectives. Some researchers compare product 
bundling with other strategies such as advance selling 
(Alexandrov & Bedre-defolie, 2014) and reserved 
product pricing (Prasad, Venkatesh, and Mahajan, 2015). 
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Other scholars investigate the bundling issue associated 
with data. Raghunathan and Sarkar (2016) examine the 
issues of data product design and pricing in the 
information market and find that the bundling of data 
products may soften the competition structure. Danaher 
et al. (2014) highlight the value of “big data” as a 
management paradigm and leverage large datasets 
available to media firms to address the challenges and 
opportunities in the context of pricing and mixed 
bundling in the music industry. In another strand of this 
literature, Shugan et al. (2017) investigate how firms  
bundle ancillary services with different core products in 
a vertical product line and examine whether the inherent 
difference between low-end and high-end products 
plays a role in determining firms’ bundling strategies. 
Derdenger and Kumar (2013) empirically examine 
whether product bundling would lead to the 
cannibalization of pure components or a market 
expansion and whether network externality and product 
complementarity would relatively increase or decrease 
the effectiveness of PB. Zhang, Yue, and Hui (2019a, 
2019b) investigate the optimal bundling decisions in the 
cloud computing era with a special focus on software 
piracy. Koh, Hann, and Raghunathan (2019) empirically 
show that unbundling, not piracy, has played a dominant 
role in causing a decline in industry revenue. Venkatesh 
and Mahajan (2009) provide a comprehensive review of 
product bundling, and Rao et al. (2018) summarize the 
emerging trends in product bundling. 
Our work is perhaps closest to that of Prasad et al. 
(2010), who examine optimal bundling decisions for 
two technology products with network effects. However, 
these authors did not consider the indirect network effect 
because the context was a high-technology industry. 
These authors report that bundling works effectively in 
a scenario with lower marginal costs and higher network 
effects, whereas unbundling works better in a scenario 
with higher divergences in product costs and network 
effects. In other cases, MB is optimal. Our results 
support their conclusion that PB can be considered an 
optimal plan in situations characterized by a strong 
network effect. However, we have additional findings of 
practical interest. If the software product and service are 
highly integrated through integration tools, vendors 
would gain by offering the products separately instead 
of offering them in a package. In addition, ESB can 
improve the value of on-premises software by 
facilitating an integration with cloud-based software 
services; thus, software providers can derive higher 
overall value from all consumers and realize higher 
profits. This view contrasts with the current perceptions 
that iPaaS is a better option. 
Our work is also closely related to the study by Pang and 
Etzion (2012), who examine the optimal bundling 
strategies in situations wherein the firm sells a 
complementary product and other online 
complementary services at positive costs. However, 
those researchers assumed that the value of the 
complementary online service is conditional on the 
product, that is, that the online service cannot be used 
alone. Moreover, these authors did not consider the 
indirect network effect. In our model, customers value 
the offered software service, and the purchase of the 
software product is not a condition for the sale of the 
associated service. Second, Pang and Etzion (2012) 
assume that network externality exists only for the 
service but not for the product. Our model is more 
general and relevant to the software industry in the sense 
that network externality occurs for both the software 
product and the service. Third, the researchers did not 
consider a potential effect represented by the extra value 
users receive when using both products. These authors 
find that the complementary service’s network effect 
would induce customers to choose both products, and 
therefore it is optimal for the firm to sell them separately 
to extract a higher value from customers. We also find 
that unbundling is the dominant strategy when software 
products are integrated and network effects are strong; 
however, we reach this conclusion for a different 
reason—high indirect network utilities would induce 
customers to buy separate products. 
2.2 Network Effect 
In the software literature, there is a strand of research 
on the network effect issue (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; 
Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996). For instance, there 
are studies on the optimal software free-trial strategy 
for emphasizing network effects (Cheng & Liu, 2012; 
Cheng, Li and Liu, 2015), the optimal software design 
discussing the tradeoff between network effects and 
the cannibalization effect (Cheng & Tang, 2010), the 
impact of network externalities on the competition 
between open-source software and proprietary 
software (Cheng, Liu, & Tang, 2011), and the strategic 
difference between a proprietary technology platform 
and an open-source platform (Economides & 
Katsamakas, 2006). 
Some researchers have examined the economic impact 
of network effects introduced by platforms (Caillaud & 
Jullien, 2003; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005; Rochet & 
Tirole, 2006; Anderson Jr., Parker, & Tan., 2014). 
Specifically, Parker and Van Alstyne (2005) study the 
policies of information product design; they also 
discuss sales concerning “platform intermediaries” 
from the platform perspective, with a specific 
consideration of the two-sided network effect. These 
authors find that the network effect influences the 
choice of the market to be subsidized. Considering 
tradeoffs between the technical performance of the 
platform and content quality, Anderson Jr. et al. (2014) 
study the firms’ decisions regarding whether to build a 
platform in video game-like industries. These authors 
show that, owing to cross-network externalities, video 
game platforms may opt to invest more heavily in 
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content development in order to enable a larger number 
of developers to participate in the platform. 
Unlike the previous literature, our model is not based 
on a pure two-sided market setting. Conversely, our 
model targets a monopolistic software vendor and a 
marketing situation in which two different integration 
methods can be adopted to integrate on-premises 
software applications with cloud-based software 
service and in which this integration can produce 
strong cross-product network opportunities for the 
integrated software products. Moreover, this study 
pursues a completely different research objective—the 
optimal bundling strategy and integration policy—and 
focuses on the integration effect from integration tools 
in the context of two types of network effects. 
The literature mainly investigates the indirect network 
effect from either a complementary-products’ 
perspective or a product-compatibility perspective. 
Researchers have widely examined the indirect 
network effect between two complementary products, 
such as that between TV hardware manufacturers and 
software complementors (Gupta, Jain & Sawhney, 
1999), personal computers and the internet (Dewan, 
Ganley & Kraemer, 2010), and wireless voice and data 
services (Niculescu & Whang, 2012). In contrast, 
Hann, Koh, and Niculescu (2016) empirically examine 
the indirect network effect between a mobile internet 
platform and its compatible services. Nair, 
Chintagunta, and Dube (2004) empirically investigate 
the size of the indirect network effects between 
hardware and compatible software in high-technology 
markets. Considering the indirect network effect, Zhao 
and Xia (2014) empirically investigate the formation 
of interoperability and its impact on organizational 
performance. In a situation in which network effects 
play a critical role, Bonaccorsi et al. (2006) empirically 
examine the strategy of software firms for gaining 
entry to a market dominated by incumbents’ standards.  
In contrast to the abovementioned literature, we study 
the indirect network effect introduced when two 
completely different software architectures, that is, on-
premises software and cloud-based software services, 
are integrated such that users derive an additional 
indirect benefit from the other software connected to 
the integration tools. 
2.3 Product Compatibility 
Compatibility could be defined as the extent to which 
one product is similar enough to the other such that it 
can benefit from the same word-of-mouth or installed 
base effect as that of the other product (Xie & Sirbu, 
1995). Our work relates to this stream of literature.  
Researchers have investigated the issue of 
compatibility along with the network effect in a 
competitive setting. Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1994) 
find that firms with larger existing networks are 
opposed to product compatibility, while firms with 
smaller existing networks tend to favor compatibility. 
Xie and Sirbu (1995) analytically find that 
compatibility increases product value for both firms; 
thus, both firms can obtain higher profits if they agree 
on a common standard. Lee and Mendelson (2007) 
study the technology adoption dynamics in a market 
with the network effect. These authors show that 
customers are better off if products are incompatible in 
a competitive market. Liu et al. (2011) find that both 
firms can agree to provide converters to achieve 
compatibility and gain from the conversion; this profit 
can be attributed to the fact that the conversion 
technology would alleviate price competition if the 
network effects are not very large. Chellappa and Saraf 
(2010) empirically show that, motivated by a demand-
side need instead of by resource sharing, vendors form 
alliances to maintain technological compatibility and 
signal compatibility to client organizations.  
Other scholars investigate the impact of compatibility 
on other issues such as piracy, investment, product 
innovation, and adoption. Focusing on piracy issues, 
Chellappa and Shivendu (2003) analytically study 
product standardization in the optical disc market. 
These authors conclude that movie studios should 
maintain separate technology standards in different 
regions. Li and Chen (2012) find that sellers invest in 
mutual compatibility only if there is a moderate 
difference in their competitive advantages. Tarafdar 
and Tanriverdi (2018) examine the relationship 
between an IT unit’s technology standardization 
support and product innovation and the influence of 
this relationship on a firm’s performance. In the 
context of backward compatibility, Hann et al. (2016) 
study the impact of the intergenerational nature of 
services on the adoption of multigenerational 
platforms.  
Unlike the abovementioned literature, our article 
discusses compatibility and the associated network 
externality derived from the product bundling 
framework. We investigate the impact of compatibility 
on the optimal bundling decisions of software vendors. 
Our work is closely related to Economides and 
Katsamakas (2006), who establish an analytical model 
to compare industry structures based on a proprietary 
technology platform with those based on an open-
source platform in terms of pricing, sales, profitability, 
and social welfare. However, our study differs in 
several ways. First, we investigate the optimal 
integration choice across on-premises software and 
cloud-based software services. Second, we focus on 
network effect issues, including both direct and 
indirect network effects, and examine the situation in 
which the indirect network effect is moderated by 
different integration methods. Third, our model is built 
on a two-product bundling scenario wherein demand 
can be derived based on a certain market segmentation. 
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Considering that market segmentations differ 
significantly depending on the values of key 
parameters and the recursiveness of demand functions, 
we solved high-order equation systems to determine 
the demand. Thus, the complexity of the equilibrium 
analysis in our study is much higher.  
3 Model Setup 
3.1 The Vendor 
A monopolistic vendor sells certain on-premises 
software (referred to here as a software product or 
product) and cloud-based software services (referred 
to here as a software service or service) 6 to maximize 
profits.  
Assumption 1: The software product and the 
service are independently valued. 
Our assumption specifies that these two products are 
independently valued;7 for example, one is a human 
resource software product, and the other is a process 
planning solution. To solve the information silo 
problem and integrate the software product and service, 
the vendor could choose between an ESB or iPaaS, 
which are different in terms of architecture and 
implementation mode. We further assume that ESB 
connects to the software product as a function module8 
because two software applications working together 
can be understood as one “large” application and the 
functionalities of the two “component software” 
modules can be understood as two function modules 
that are part of a larger software application. 
Assumption 2: The marginal cost of the on-
premises software application is zero; the per-user 
 
6  In this article, we interchangeably use the terms on-
premises software, software product, or product to refer to 
on-premises software. Similarly, we interchangeably use the 
terms cloud-based software service, software service, or 
service to refer to cloud-based software services. 
7  Two products may complement (or substitute for) each 
other when products offer complementary (or overlapping) 
features, functionalities, attributes, and working modules. 
This article considers the more general case in which two 
products are independently valued; this is because product 
complementarity/substitutability only exists under certain 
circumstances. The impact of product complementarity/ 
substitutability on optimal bundling decisions has been 
discussed in the literature (Venkatesh and Kamakura, 2003). 
Product complementarity/substitutability is not the key issue 
in this article; a consideration of product complementarity/ 
substitutability would increase model complexity and is 
beyond the scope of just one article. 
8 For instance, an IBM Integration ESB can be perceived as 
being tied with another IBM software solution such that this 
solution can “communicate” with other software via its 
integration module, IBM Integration ESB. 
9 It must be noted that the development cost is not dependent 
on the quantity sold. The development costs of ESB and 
infrastructure cost for the cloud-based software 
service is positive.  
The marginal cost of the software product once 
developed is assumed to be zero (Bakos & 
Brynjolfsson, 1999; Dewan & Fremer, 2003). Indeed, 
the marginal costs incurred for maintaining and 
improving the software product approach zero in the 
software industry (Kluis, 2016). The cloud-based 
software service incurs a constant per-user software-
support infrastructure cost of 𝑐 ∈ [0,1] (Marston et al., 
2011; Feng, Jiang & Liu, 2018; Guo & Ma, 2018). This 
positive per user infrastructure cost includes a software 
service maintenance cost, possible quality/features 
improvement costs, and a bug-fixing cost, which are 
real costs in the software industry.9  
Our model assumes that the vendor can choose from 
the following selling strategies: PC, PB, and MB. The 
unit prices for the software product, service, and the 
bundle are 𝑝𝑃 , 𝑝𝑆 , and 𝑝𝐵 , respectively, and the 
demands are 𝑑𝑃 , 𝑑𝑆 , and 𝑑𝐵 , respectively, which can 
be calculated by considering the price equilibrium and 
the customer-reservation utility. The vendor would 
select a strategy that would maximize its own profit. 
3.2 Product Utility 
Assumption 3: The customers’ reservation utilities 
for a software product and service are jointly and 
uniformly distributed. 
 
Since customers are heterogeneous, their reservation 
utilities for a software product and a service are jointly 
uniformly distributed—(𝑟𝑃 , 𝑟𝑆) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1]  (Prasad 
et al., 2010; Bhargava, 2013). This assumption aims to 
iPaaS are associated with their quality (e.g., integration 
efficiency). The detailed function of the development costs 
of ESB and iPaaS will be presented in the following section. 
Following the assumption of equal maximum product utility 
in the existing bundling literature (Prasad et al., 2010; 
Bhargava, 2013), it is assumed that the development costs of 
the software product and service, 𝑡1  and 𝑡2 , are constant, 
which is consistent with the special case of the convexity 
function in Jones and Mendelson’s (2011) work. This article 
assumes a constant development cost to void the complexity 
from multiple parameters in the development cost function. 
The development costs of the software product and the 
service have no impact on optimal bundling decision-
making. This is because, regardless of the bundling strategy 
chosen, vendors must pay the same total development costs 
for the software product and the service. Given that the 
integration effect is a more critical issue, for the purpose of 
modeling simplicity, this article focuses more on the 
development cost of ESB and iPaaS instead of that of the 
software product and service. In some sense, the 
development costs of the software product and service could 
also be included in the development costs of ESB and iPaaS.  
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capture customer heterogeneity simultaneously without 
causing too much complexity during the demand 
calculation.10 Because they are independently valued, if 
the consumer purchases both the product and the service, 
the aggregate utility will be the sum of the stand-alone 
utilities of the software product and the service: 𝑟𝑃𝑆 =
𝑟𝑃 + 𝑟𝑆  (Venkatesh & Kamakura, 2003; Prasad et al., 
2010; Bhargava, 2013). 11 In addition to its intrinsic utility, 
software usage introduces several positive network 
externalities. The degrees of network externalities 
associated with the software product and the service are 
measured by 𝛿𝑃  and 𝛿𝑆 , respectively. Therefore, a 
software product (or service) user can potentially gain a 
network utility equal to 𝛿𝑃𝑑𝑃 (or 𝛿𝑆𝑑𝑆) from other users 
of the software product (or service). This effect is called 
the direct network effect.  
Assumption 4: The intensity of the network 
externality associated with a cloud-based software 
service is higher than that associated with an on-
premises software application. 
Given that a cloud-based software service can provide 
an enhanced collaborative environment, it can be 
assumed that the network effect of a software service 
is correspondingly higher than that of a software 
product: 𝛿𝑃 < 𝛿𝑆 (Wainewright, 2009). For example, 
iPaaS can support multitenanting, which refers to a 
single instance of software running on a single server 
while serving multiple groups of users. However, ESB 
does not support this feature. This fact gives iPaaS 
solutions an advantage over ESB solutions because 
multiple tenants or users can share a single instance to 
reduce redundancies effectively in integration 
processes while reducing infrastructure and 
administrative costs during integration (Mulesoft, 
2018b). Most functionalities of cloud-based software 
services are more easily shared with other users. In fact, 
this collaborative feature is the reflection of a strong 
network externality for cloud-based software services. 
This phenomenon could be captured by a stronger 
network effect arising for cloud-based software 
services than for on-premises software applications. A 
similar assumption has been made in the literature 
(Feng et al., 2018).  
 
Assumption 5: When integrating different types of 
software, the integration effects of the integration 
methods ESB and iPaaS are asymmetric. 
 
10 Other kinds of distributions (e.g., a normal distribution) for 
customer heterogeneity could lead to computation 
complexity or even make it impossible to derive analytical 
results. 
11  When two products complement, the consumers’ 
reservation utility for the bundle would be superadditive to 
that of the component products. When two products are 
substitutes, the consumers’ reservation utility for the bundle 
The presence of an integration tool (ESB and iPaaS) 
promotes the integration of software products and 
services, which enables consumers to benefit indirectly 
from the consumption of others, even when they 
consume only a single product. This integration effect 
also moderates the indirect network utility consumers 
can gain depending on the design and implementation 
of ESB as well as the amount and efficiency of the 
adapters provided by iPaaS. This moderation effect is 
asymmetric by nature because of heterogeneous 
adapters and connectors. This heterogeneity can be 
explained by the presence of different types of 
connectors and adapters designed and implemented 
separately on the cloud side or on the traditional 
software side because of the different architectures 
used for cloud services and on-premises software.12 
For instance, iPaaS is a cloud-based software service 
and can thus integrate with other cloud-based software 
services more efficiently than with on-premises 
software applications. However, ESB is an on-
premises software application and can thus integrate 
with other on-premises software applications more 
efficiently than with cloud-based software services. To 
capture this phenomenon, we use 𝛽𝑆 (or 𝛽𝑃) to denote 
the intensity of the network value that software product 
(or software service) users could indirectly gain from 
the software service (or software product). Thus, the 
network value that software product (or service) users 
can indirectly gain from the software service (or 
software product) would be modeled as 𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆𝑑𝑆  (or 
𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃𝑑𝑃 ). By stipulating 0 ≤ 𝛽𝑃, 𝛽𝑆 ≤ 1 , we find an 
increase of customers deriving high network utility 
through the direct use of a product or service. 
Following the work of Jones and Mendelson (2011), 
the development costs of ESB and iPaaS, 𝑘1 and 𝑘2 , 
respectively, are associated with their integration 
effects; for example, 𝑘1 = 𝑓1(𝛽𝑃 , 𝛽𝑆),  and 𝑘2 =
𝑓2(𝛽𝑃, 𝛽𝑆). In the numerical analysis in Section 4, we 
use specific functions for the development costs of 
ESB and iPaaS, respectively. 
3.3 Consumers 
Consumers can benefit from consuming the software 
product, the service, or both. We assume that 
consumers make rational decisions and hold equal 
expectations about the size of the network. For a 
software product consumer, the aggregate utility 
gained comprises the intrinsic product utility 𝑟𝑃 and 
the network utility 𝛿𝑃𝑑𝑃 + 𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆𝑑𝑆, where  𝛿𝑃𝑑𝑃 is the 
would be subadditive to that of the components. In this 
article, we focus on the case where the software product and 
service are independently valued. Thus, the consumers’ 
reservation utility for the bundle would be additive to that of 
the components. 
12  https://searchcloudapplications.techtarget.com/opinion/ 
IPaaS-Confusion-around-cloud-and-on-premises-app-
integration 
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direct network value from the software product 
purchased, and 𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆𝑑𝑆 is the indirect network value 
from the software service not directly purchased but 
gained by the consumer indirectly through integration. 
The addition of 𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆𝑑𝑆 enables us to model the effect 
of integration tools. Similarly, a software service 
consumer receives 𝑟𝑆 + 𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃𝑑𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆𝑑𝑆 . If a vendor 
provides only the bundle with the demand 𝑑𝐵 , the 
resulting network utility will be defined as (𝛿𝑃 +
𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵 and the total utility one consumer can gain will 
be 𝑟𝑃 + 𝑟𝑆 + (𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵 . Given the stated utilities, 
Table 2 reports the aggregate utilities under each 
selling strategy. 
The market segmentation for each selling strategy is 
illustrated in Figures 2, 3, and 4. The detailed 
discussions of how different parameters would impact 
the demand for each selling option under each 
bundling strategy is presented in Appendix A. 
 
Table 2: Customers’ Aggregate Utility under Different Strategies 
Strategy Purchase options Aggregate utility 
PC 
Software product only  𝑟𝑃 + 𝛿𝑃𝑑𝑃 + 𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆𝑑𝑆 − 𝑝𝑃 
Software service only  𝑟𝑆 + 𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃𝑑𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆𝑑𝑆 − 𝑝𝑆 
Software product and the 
service 
∑ 𝑟𝑖
𝑖=𝑃,𝑆
+ 𝛿𝑃𝑑𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆𝑑𝑆 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑖=𝑃,𝑆
 
Nothing 0 
PB 
Bundle ∑ 𝑟𝑖
𝑖=𝑃,𝑆
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑑𝐵
𝑖=𝑃,𝑆
− 𝑝𝐵 
Nothing 0 
MB 
Software product only 𝑟𝑃 + 𝛿𝑃(𝑑𝑃 + 𝑑𝐵) + 𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆(𝑑𝑆 + 𝑑𝐵) − 𝑝𝑃 
Software service only 𝑟𝑆 + 𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃(𝑑𝑃 + 𝑑𝐵) + 𝛿𝑆(𝑑𝑆 + 𝑑𝐵) − 𝑝𝑆 
Bundle  ∑ 𝑟𝑖
𝑖=𝑃,𝑆
+ 𝛿𝑃(𝑑𝑃 + 𝑑𝐵) + 𝛿𝑆(𝑑𝑆 + 𝑑𝐵) − 𝑝𝐵 
Nothing 0 
 
 
Figure 2: Market Segmentation in PC 
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Figure 3: Market Segmentation in PB 
 
Figure 4: Market Segmentation in MB 
 
3.4 The Vendor’s Optimization Problem 
When examining bundling complexities, the presence of 
network externality introduces the issue of demand 
recursiveness while computing product demand. 
Increased product demand causes higher network utility, 
thereby increasing the network utility of the product 
attracting more potential buyers. The recursive property 
introduces the need for more elaborate computations to 
assure model equilibrium. Due to its recursive property, 
demand cannot be restricted to its respective market 
segmentation; instead, when prices are set, the demand 
for a software product, service, and bundle can be 
determined by solving the quadratic equation systems of 
𝑑𝑃 , 𝑑𝑆,  and 𝑑𝐵 . Subsequently, by comparing profits 
when prices and demands are available, the optimal 
prices and profits can be evaluated. 
Computational complexity arises from the irregularities 
in market segmentation introduced due to changes in 
price. It follows that all the potential computational cases 
must be evaluated in order to determine the optimal 
equilibrium for each sales plan. Hence, a numerical 
approach is required to determine the global optimum. 
The bundling literature commonly uses numerical 
simulation approaches (Adams & Yellen, 1976; 
Schmalensee, 1984; Venkatesh & Kamakura, 2003; 
Bhargava, 2013), especially in the presence of a network 
externality (Prasad et al., 2010). Since the number of 
parameters and variables in this analysis is limited, an 
exhaustive approach to this problem can be adopted. 
The software vendor aims to maximize profits by setting 
optimal prices (𝑝𝑃 , 𝑝𝑆,  and/or 𝑝𝐵 ) applicable to each 
selling strategy. Table 3 presents the vendor’s 
optimization problems for PC, PB, and MB. In this article, 
we consider the development costs of ESB and iPaaS. 
Table 4 summarizes all the notations used in the model. 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
 
1517 
Table 3. Firm’s Optimizing Problem Under Different Selling Strategies 
PC 
max
𝑝𝑃,𝑝𝑆
 𝜋 = 𝑝𝑃𝑑𝑃 + (𝑝𝑆 − 𝑐)𝑑𝑆 − 𝑘𝑖  
s.t. 0 < 𝑝𝑃 < 𝑝𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥 & 0 < 𝑝𝑆 < 𝑝𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 
where the demands are: 
𝑑𝑃 = 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 (𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝐵𝐶𝐹) 
𝑑𝑆 = 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎(𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝐸𝐵𝐶𝐷) 
PB 
 
max
𝑝𝐵
 𝜋 = (𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐)𝑑𝐵 − 𝑘𝑖 
s.t. 0 < 𝑝𝐵 < 𝑝𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥 
where the demands are: 
𝑑𝐵 =
{
 
 
 
 
1, 0 < 𝑝𝐵 < (𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵
 1 −
(𝑝𝐵 − (𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵)
2
2
, (𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵 < 𝑝𝐵 < 1 + (𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵 
(2 − 𝑝𝐵 + (𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵)
2
2
, 1 + (𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵 < 𝑝𝐵 < 2 + (𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵
 
MB 
max
𝑝𝑃,𝑝𝑆,𝑝𝐵
𝜋 = 𝑝𝑃𝑑𝑃 + (𝑝𝑆 − 𝑐)𝑑𝑆 +(𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐)𝑑𝐵 − 𝑘𝑖 
s.t. 0 < 𝑝𝑃 < 𝑝𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥, 0 < 𝑝𝑆 < 𝑝𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 and max (𝑝𝑃, 𝑝𝑆) < 𝑝𝐵 < 𝑝𝑃 + 𝑝𝑆 
where the demands are: 
𝑑𝑃 = [1 − 𝑝𝑃 + 𝛿𝑃(𝑑𝑃 + 𝑑𝐵) + 𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆(𝑑𝑆 + 𝑑𝐵)][𝑝𝐵 − 𝑝𝑃 − (1 − 𝛽𝑆)𝛿𝑆(𝑑𝑆 + 𝑑𝐵)] 
𝑑𝑆 = [1 − 𝑝𝑆 + 𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃(𝑑𝑃 + 𝑑𝐵) + 𝛿𝑆(𝑑𝑆 + 𝑑𝐵)][𝑝𝐵 − 𝑝𝑆 − (1 − 𝛽𝑃)𝛿𝑃(𝑑𝑃 + 𝑑𝐵)] 
𝑑𝐵 = [1 − 𝑝𝐵 + 𝑝𝑆 + (1 − 𝛽𝑃)𝛿𝑃(𝑑𝑃 + 𝑑𝐵)][1 − 𝑝𝐵 + 𝑝𝑃 + (1 − 𝛽𝑆)𝛿𝑆(𝑑𝑆 + 𝑑𝐵)] 
−
1
2
[𝑝𝑃 + 𝑝𝑆 − 𝑝𝐵 − 𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃(𝑑𝑃 + 𝑑𝐵) − 𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆(𝑑𝑆 + 𝑑𝐵)]
2 
 
Table 4: Notations in the Model 
𝒄 Per-user infrastructure cost of the software service 
𝒓𝒊, 𝒊 = 𝑷, 𝑺 Reservation utility of product 𝑖 
𝒑𝒊, 𝒊 = 𝑷, 𝑺, 𝑩 Price of the software product, service, or bundle 
𝒅𝒊, 𝒊 = 𝑷, 𝑺,𝑩 Demand of the software product, service, or bundle 
𝜹𝒊, 𝒊 = 𝑷, 𝑺 
Network externality degree or intensity associated with the 
software product or service 
𝜷𝑷 
iPaaS’s integration effect from the software product to the software 
service 
𝜷𝑺 
ESB’s integration effect from the software service to the software 
product 
𝒌𝒊, 𝒊 = 𝟏, 𝟐 Development cost of ESB (𝑖 = 1) or iPaaS (𝑖 = 2) 
𝒇𝒊(∙) Function of the development cost of ESB (𝑖 = 1) or iPaaS (𝑖 = 2) 
𝒂 Development cost coefficient for ESB  
𝒃 Development cost coefficient for iPaaS 
𝝅 Profit of the vendor 
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4 Results and Analyses 
We answer the proposed research question by 
analyzing three models. This section considers Model 
1, where an independent network externality exists and 
no integration methods are present (e.g., 𝛽𝑃 = 0 and 
𝛽𝑆 = 0 ). This model aims to relate to the literature. 
Then, we consider the asymmetric integration effect 
between a software product and a service. To keep the 
model concise, we investigate two extreme cases. In 
the first case, only users of the software service can 
gain an indirect network value from the software 
product, but not the reverse (e.g., 𝛽𝑃 > 0 and 𝛽𝑆 = 0). 
This case is analyzed in Model 2. This model is 
suitable to illustrate the phenomenon where iPaaS is 
adopted. For instance, SCP-Integration can support 
multiple protocols such that SAP cloud users can 
efficiently connect to other SAP software applications 
and indirectly gain network value from them. In the 
second case, only users of the software product can 
gain an indirect network value from the software 
service but not the reverse (e.g., 𝛽𝑃 = 0 and 𝛽𝑆 > 0). 
This case is analyzed in Model 3. This model is 
suitable to illustrate the phenomenon when ESB is 
adopted. For instance, SAP’s data-centric process 
discovery tool—process mining—can help users gain 
complete transparency into process execution and gain 
synergy value from other software applications. Finally, 
we compare the optimality between Model 2 and 3. 
4.1 Model 1 (Only an Independent 
Network Effect and No Integration) 
Consistent with the software literature, this section 
rests on the assumptions that the network effect is 
present and that software products and services have 
direct network effects; when more users adopt a 
software product (or service), owing to higher 
reachability and interconnecting features, there will be 
an increase the value of the software product (or 
service); however, the value of the software service (or 
product) will not witness an increase; for example, 
𝛿𝑃 > 0 , 𝛿𝑆 > 0 , 𝛽𝑃 = 0  and 𝛽𝑆 = 0 . Under such a 
scenario, the development costs of ESB and iPaaS are 
zero; for example, 𝑘1 = 0  and 𝑘2 = 0 . Closed-form 
solutions are available for equilibria for PC and PB but 
not for MB. 
Lemma 1 shows that, compared to the situation in 
which there is no network effect, the presence of a 
network externality would change the pricing of 
software products and services (as in Appendix B13), 
demonstrating that prices and demands increase with 
an increase in the network effects. A vendor in a 
situation with stronger network effects can achieve 
higher profits by setting higher prices and can realize a 
higher demand by leveraging a higher consumer 
surplus. All proofs are given in Appendix C. Regarding 
PB, the results are presented by Lemma 2. 
Lemma 1: The optimal prices, demands, and profit for PC are: 
Prices 𝑝𝑃
∗ = {
1
2
, 0 < 𝛿𝑃 <
1
2
𝛿𝑃 ,
1
2
< 𝛿𝑃 < 1
 and 𝑝𝑆
∗ = {
1+𝑐
2
, 0 < 𝛿𝑆 <
1+𝑐
2
𝛿𝑆,
1+𝑐
2
< 𝛿𝑆 < 1
 
Demands 𝑑𝑃
∗ = {
1
2(1−𝛿𝑃)
, 0 < 𝛿𝑃 <
1
2
1,
1
2
< 𝛿𝑃 < 1
 and 𝑑𝑆
∗ = {
1−𝑐
2(1−𝛿𝑆)
, 0 < 𝛿𝑆 <
1+𝑐
2
1,
1+𝑐
2
< 𝛿𝑆 < 1
 
Profit 𝜋∗ =
{
 
 
1
4(1 − 𝛿𝑃)
, 0 < 𝛿𝑃 <
1
2
𝛿𝑃 ,
1
2
< 𝛿𝑃 < 1
+
{
 
 
(1 − 𝑐)2
4(1 − 𝛿𝑆)
, 0 < 𝛿𝑆 <
1 + 𝑐
2
𝛿𝑆,
1 + 𝑐
2
< 𝛿𝑆 < 1
 
 
Lemma 2: The optimal price and demand for PB are: 
Price 𝑝𝐵
∗ =
{
 
 
 
 2 + 2𝑐
3
−
(3 − √9 − 16(𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)(2 − 𝑐))
2
96(𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)
, 𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆 < 𝑐 −
1
2
(𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵
∗ + √2(1 − 𝑑𝐵
∗ ), 𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆 > 𝑐 −
1
2
 
Demand 
𝑑𝐵
∗ = (
3−√9−16(𝛿𝑃+𝛿𝑆)(2−𝑐)
4√2(𝛿𝑃+𝛿𝑆)
)
2
 when 𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆 < 𝑐 −
1
2
, 
𝑑𝐵
∗  is the solution of 2(𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵 +
2−3𝑑𝐵
√2(1−𝑑𝐵)
− 𝑐 = 0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆 > 𝑐 −
1
2
 
 
13  In Appendix B, a special scenario where network 
externality does not exist is considered. The equilibrium is 
analyzed for PC, PB, and MB.  
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Figure 5 illustrates equilibrium for PB under different 
network-effect parameter values; the straight lines 
represent equilibrium in the absence of network 
externality and the curves indicate the presence of a 
direct network effect. These figures clearly show that 
the presence of a network externality impacts the 
vendor’s pricing strategy. The first panel of Figure 5 
indicates that when 𝑐 is high, as the network effects 
increase, 𝑝𝐵
∗  will first decrease before increasing. The 
implication is that when the user base for a bundle is 
relatively small—that is, when 𝑐 is high—the vendor 
should exploit network externalities introduced by 
initially lowering 𝑝𝐵
∗ . In the cases where the user base 
is sufficiently large, i.e., when 𝑐  is low, the vendor 
should always set a higher 𝑝𝐵
∗   when network 
externality is large. In general, 𝑑𝐵
∗   and 𝜋∗  increase 
with an increase in network effects. 
Due to the inherent complexity, an analytical solution 
for MB is unavailable. By numerically deriving the 
equilibrium for MB and subsequently comparing PC, 
PB, and MB, we find the following: 
Result 1: PB dominates MB when the network 
externality is higher than certain threshold values 
14, and the dominance is more apparent when the 
infrastructure cost is low. Otherwise, MB is optimal.
 
  
 
Figure 5: Equilibrium of PB with Direct Network Effects (Price, Demand, and Profit) 
 
14 The threshold value is not static and is dependent on the 
value of other parameters; for example, 𝑐 in Model 1. The 
approximated boundary condition for PB to be optimal is that 
the combined network externality must be higher than 
approximately 0.8 when 𝑐 = 0.6  and higher than 
approximately 0.6 when 𝑐 = 0 . Generally, the lower the 
infrastructure cost of cloud-based software service, the lower 
will be the threshold value for the combined network 
externality in the boundary condition (as shown in Figure 6 
in the main article and Figure C1 in Appendix C.  
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
Network Effect: 
O
p
ti
m
a
l 
B
u
n
d
le
 P
ri
ce
: 
 p
B
 
 
Net.c = 0.20
Net. c = 0.50
Net. c = 0.70
Net. c = 0.90
Base c = 0.20
Base c = 0.50
Base c = 0.70
Base c = 0.90
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Network Effect: 
O
p
ti
m
a
l 
B
u
n
d
le
 D
e
m
a
n
d
: 
 d
B
 
 
Net.c = 0.20
Net. c = 0.50
Net. c = 0.70
Net. c = 0.90
Base c = 0.20
Base c = 0.50
Base c = 0.70
Base c = 0.90
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
Network Effect: 
O
p
ti
m
a
l 
P
ro
fi
t:
 
 
 
Net.c = 0.20
Net. c = 0.50
Net. c = 0.70
Net. c = 0.90
Base c = 0.20
Base c = 0.50
Base c = 0.70
Base c = 0.90
Integration of On-Premises and Cloud-Based Software  
 
1520 
  
𝑐 = 0 𝑐 = 0.6 
Figure 6: Optimal Strategy with Direct Network Externality in Model 1 
MB is a better strategy when network externalities are 
either low or zero. Higher network externalities lead to 
an increase in the proportion of customers with higher 
aggregate utilities for the software product and the 
service; therefore, a simultaneous offering of the 
software product and the service would be preferred. It 
follows that PB could be helpful in extracting more 
value from customers; this finding is in line with the 
work by Prasad et al. (2010). In contrast, MB prices 
would be higher than those of PB, driving away some 
customers with high aggregate utility, though not 
sufficiently high to buy a bundle. Therefore, when 
network externalities are high, PB offers a better 
strategy than MB. This phenomenon may likely be the 
case denoted by SAP, which consolidates sales, 
marketing, and customer service software and bundles 
the offerings into a suite of solutions under its business 
planning offerings (PYMNTS, 2018).  
High infrastructure costs make both the software 
product and the service difficult to bundle; it implies 
that PB should be the optimal strategy when 
infrastructure cost is low and that MB should be 
considered when the infrastructure cost is high. Figure 
6 (and Figure C1 in Appendix C) shows the optimal 
selling strategy under different infrastructure costs and 
network externalities. 
The following subsections present the analysis of the 
asymmetric integration of software products and 
services by using iPaaS (Model 2) and ESB (Model 3). 
4.2 Model 2 (Only Software-Service 
Users Indirectly Gain from the 
Software Product: Integration via 
iPaaS) 
The integration effect introduces several kinds of 
adapters that enable the flow of data, command, and 
information between software products and services. 
In this way, iPaaS and ESB integrate user networks for 
software products and services, enhance reachability, 
and enlarge the scope of the user networks. 
Furthermore, integration effects can be higher or lower 
depending on the efficiency and flexibility of the 
adapters, and an increase in the number of more 
flexible adapters/connectors generates a greater impact. 
We measure the integration effect of a software product 
on a software service and that of a software service on 
a software product by using 𝛽𝑃 and 𝛽𝑆, respectively. 
Given the difference between software products and 
services—i.e., relating to architecture, design, and 
implementation—and the fact that ESB is effective for 
on-premises software, while iPaaS is effective for 
cloud-based services, 𝛽𝑃  and 𝛽𝑆  are different and 
asymmetric by nature.  
An increase in the number of parameters would 
significantly increase model and analytical 
complexities. In this subsection, we consider the case 
in which only software service users can indirectly 
gain network value from a software product, not the 
other way around—that is, 𝛽𝑃 > 0 and 𝛽S = 0 . This 
model can be understood as a scenario where iPaaS 
could facilitate data transition from software-product 
clients to software-service clients. However, for 
transitioning from software-service clients to software-
product clients, this process will be inefficient owing 
to inconsistencies between different software 
architectures. Under such a scenario, in order to 
perform the numerical analysis, the development cost 
of iPaaS is assumed to be 𝑘2 = 𝑏𝛽𝑃 , with 𝑏  as the 
coefficient. The linear function for the iPaaS 
development cost is consistent with the special case of 
the convexity cost function in the work of Jones and 
Mendelson (2011). Moreover, 𝑘1 = 0 because 𝛽S = 0. 
The closed-form solution for PC can be derived as 
follows: 
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Lemma 3: The interior optimal prices and demands for PC are: 
Prices 15 
{
 
 
 
 𝑝𝑃
∗ =
𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2 − 2(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝛿𝑆) + 𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝑐)
𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2 − 4(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝛿𝑆)
𝑝𝑆
∗ =
−𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃(1 − 𝛿𝑆) − 2(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝛿𝑆) + [𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2 − 2(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝛿𝑆)]𝑐
𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2 − 4(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝛿𝑆)
 
when 𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2 − 4(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝛿𝑆) < 0 and 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐵𝐿1, 𝐵𝐿2) < 𝑐 < 1 
Demands 
{
 
 
 
 𝑑𝑃
∗ =
−𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃(1 − 𝑐) − 2(1 − 𝛿𝑆)
𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2 − 4(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝛿𝑆)
𝑑𝑆
∗ =
−𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃 − 2(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝑐)
𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2 − 4(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝛿𝑆)
 
with {
𝜕𝑝𝑃
∗
𝜕𝛽𝑃
< 0
𝜕𝑝𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛽𝑃
> 0
 and {
𝜕𝑑𝑃
∗
𝜕𝛽𝑃
> 0
𝜕𝑑𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛽𝑃
> 0
 
 
Regarding the impact of the integration effect, an 
increase in 𝛽𝑃 leads to a decrease in 𝑝𝑃
∗  and an increase 
in 𝑝𝑆
∗ . The presence of this integration effect would 
raise the overall network value for software-service 
users because they can gain the direct network value of 
other software-service users as well as the indirect 
network value of the software product. Thus, vendors 
would set a higher 𝑝𝑆
∗. In contrast, to best leverage this 
integration effect, vendors could lower 𝑝𝑃
∗  to enlarge 
the user base of the software product and, eventually, 
increase the network value of the software product. 
Generally, vendors realize a higher 𝑑𝑃
∗  because of the 
lower 𝑝𝑃
∗  and a higher 𝑑𝑆
∗ because of the higher overall 
network value; however, 𝑝S
∗  is higher. Vendors can 
realize higher profits with a stronger integration effect. 
The analysis of PB is the same as that in Model 1. A 
comparison between PC, PB, and MB leads to the 
following: 
Result 2: If software service users could more 
efficiently gain indirect network value from a 
software product, the integration effect would lead 
to PC as the optimal strategy when network 
externalities are higher than a certain threshold 
value.16 PC is more likely to be optimal when the 
integration effect and the infrastructure costs are 
higher. 
The presence of an integration effect alters the vendors’ 
optimal selling strategy. Without an integration effect, 
the networks of software products and services stay 
 
15  𝐵𝐿1 =
𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)+2(1−𝛿𝑆)
𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃
+ 1  and 𝐵𝐿2 =
𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)+𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃
2(1−𝛿𝑃)
+ 1. 
16 The threshold value is not static and is dependent on other 
parameters; for example, 𝑐 and 𝛽𝑃 in Model 2. The boundary 
condition for PC to be optimal is that the combined network 
separate. PB is the optimal strategy when network 
externalities are strong; however, an integration effect 
establishes a relationship between the networks of both 
software products and services. It follows that buying 
the individual software alone leads a user to gain the 
interrelated network utility from the other software, 
making buying the individual software the preferred 
option, particularly when a strong integration effect 
exists. PC is, therefore, the optimal strategy when 
interrelated network externalities are present; this 
relationship becomes increasingly evident with an 
increase in the integration effect. This analysis has 
been echoed in the software industry, where SAP has 
provided multiple types of integration solutions to 
integrate various software solutions and the software 
solutions set for integration are offered separately 
instead of in a special package (Nair, 2017). 
The high infrastructure cost of a cloud service 
increases bundling complexities because, in this 
situation, the software operating environment is very 
different; this leads to a consumption scenario 
characterized by a high degree of consumer 
heterogeneity. This environment correspondingly 
deviates from the optimality of PB. Simultaneously, 
MB’s optimality increases with an increase in the 
infrastructure cost. MB would more likely be the 
optimal strategy when the infrastructure cost is higher. 
The optimal bundling strategy under different sets of 
parameter values is shown in Figures 7, 8, and 9 (as 
well as in Figures C2, C3, and C4 in Appendix C). 
externality is higher than approximately 1.4 when 𝑐 = 0.6 
and 𝛽𝑃 = 0.3, and it is higher than approximately 1.3 when 
𝑐 = 0 and 𝛽𝑃 = 0.3. In general, the lower the infrastructure 
cost and the higher the integration effect, the lower the 
threshold value for the combined network externality in the 
boundary condition (as shown in Figures 7, 8, and 9 in the 
main article and Figures C2, C3, and C4 in Appendix C. 
Integration of On-Premises and Cloud-Based Software  
 
1522 
  
𝑐 = 0 𝑐 = 0.6 
Figure 7: Optimal Strategy with 𝛃𝐏 = 𝟎. 𝟑 in Model 2 
 
  
𝑐 = 0 𝑐 = 0.6 
Figure 8: Optimal Strategy with 𝛃𝐏 = 𝟎. 𝟔 in Model 2 
 
  
𝑐 = 0 𝑐 = 0.6 
Figure 9: Optimal Strategy with 𝛃𝐏 = 𝟎. 𝟗 in Model 2 
 
4.3 Model 3 (Only Software-Product 
Users Indirectly Gain from Software-
Service: Integration through ESB) 
In this subsection, we consider the second case, in which 
only software-product users can indirectly gain network 
value from the software service, and not the reverse; for 
example, 𝛽𝑃 = 0  and 𝛽𝑆 > 0 . This model can be 
understood as entailing the scenario wherein ESB can 
facilitate data transition from a software service to a 
software product. However, ESB would be inefficient in 
enabling data transition from a software product to a 
software service owing to the inconsistency between 
software architectures. Under such a scenario, to 
perform the numerical analysis, the development cost of 
ESB is assumed to be 𝑘1 = 𝑎𝛽𝑆 , with 𝑎  as the 
coefficient. The linear function for the ESB 
development cost is consistent with the special case of 
the convexity cost function in the work of Jones and 
Mendelson (2011). Moreover, 𝑘2 = 0  since 𝛽𝑃 = 0 . 
The closed-form solution for PC can be derived as 
follows:
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Lemma 4: The interior optimal prices and demands for PC are: 
Prices 17 
{
 
 
 
 𝑝𝑃
∗ =
(1 − 𝛿𝑃)[−2(1 − 𝛿𝑆) − (1 − 𝑐)𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆]
𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2 − 4(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝛿𝑆)
𝑝𝑆
∗ =
𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2 − 2(1 + 𝑐)(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝛿𝑆) + 𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆(1 − 𝛿𝑆)
𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2 − 4(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝛿𝑆)
 
when 𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2 − 4(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝛿𝑆) < 0 and 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐵𝐿1, 𝐵𝐿2) < 𝑐 < 1 
Demands 
{
 
 
 
 𝑑𝑃
∗ =
−𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆(1 − 𝑐) − 2(1 − 𝛿𝑆)
𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2 − 4(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝛿𝑆)
𝑑𝑆
∗ =
−𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆 − 2(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝑐)
𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2 − 4(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝛿𝑆)
 
 
with {
𝜕𝑝𝑃
∗
𝜕𝛽𝑆
> 0
𝜕𝑝𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛽𝑆
< 0
 and {
𝜕𝑑𝑃
∗
𝜕𝛽𝑆
> 0
𝜕𝑑𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛽𝑆
> 0
. 
 
When software product users can indirectly gain 
network value from software services as 𝛽𝑆 increases, 
vendors would prefer to set a higher 𝑝𝑃
∗  and a lower 𝑝𝑆
∗, 
which is the opposite of Lemma 3. However, the 
underlying rationale is similar to that of Lemma 3. 
Software-product clients could gain higher overall 
network value when there are stronger asymmetric-
integration effects versus when there is an absence of 
integration effects; thus, vendors could set a higher 𝑝𝑃
∗ . 
For a software service, vendors could set a lower 𝑝𝑆
∗ to 
enlarge the user base of the software service in order to 
best leverage the network value of the software service. 
In general, vendors could realize a higher 𝑑𝑃
∗  and 𝑑S
∗ 
and higher profits. 
The equilibrium analysis of PB is the same as that in 
Model 1. By comparing PC, PB, and MB, we generally 
observe the same phenomenon as in Result 2. We 
summarize the main observations as follows. In 
general, the integration effect would lead to setting PC 
as the optimal strategy when network externalities are 
strong. PC is more likely to be optimal when the 
integration effect and the infrastructure costs are higher. 
When the network effect is strong, PC can be 
considered the optimal strategy. When the network 
effect is weak, MB is optimal; otherwise, PB can be set 
as the optimal strategy. PC is more likely to be 
effective when the asymmetric-integration effect is 
stronger. A comparison between the optimality of each 
bundling strategy is shown in Figures 10, 11, and 12 
(as well as in Figures C5, C6, and C7 in Appendix C). 
 
  
𝑐 = 0 𝑐 = 0.6 
Figure 10: Optimal Strategy with 𝛃𝐒 = 𝟎. 𝟑 in Model 3 
 
 
17  𝐵𝐿1 =
𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)+2(1−𝛿𝑆)
𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆
+ 1,  and 𝐵𝐿2 =
𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)+𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆
2(1−𝛿𝑃)
+ 1. 
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𝑐 = 0 𝑐 = 0.6 
Figure 11: Optimal Strategy with 𝛃𝐒 = 𝟎. 𝟔 in Model 3 
 
  
𝑐 = 0 𝑐 = 0.6 
Figure 12: Optimal Strategy with 𝛃𝐒 = 𝟎. 𝟗 in Model 3 
 
4.4 Comparison between Models 2 and 3 
This subsection aims to fill the academic gap regarding 
when and how to use ESB and iPaaS. On the basis of the 
detailed analysis in Models 2 and 3, we compare the 
optimal profit (already under the optimal bundling strategy) 
between these two integration methods (i.e., iPaaS or ESB; 
Model 2 vs. Model 3). However, this comparison is 
conducted at the same integration level (i.e., 𝛽𝑃 = 𝛽𝑆) and 
with other parameters kept the same. For model simplicity, 
it is first assumed that the development costs of ESB and 
iPaaS are equal; for example, in this subsection, 𝑎 = 𝑏 . 
This equal development cost assumption will be relaxed in 
Section 5. We find the following: 
Result 3: Under the same integration level, when 
integrating on-premises software and cloud-based 
software, the vendor always realizes higher profits 
by using ESB than by using iPaaS. 
The detailed numerical results supporting Result 3 are 
shown in Appendix C. Result 3 contradicts the 
perception that iPaaS is appropriate for solving the 
information silo problem; it suggests that, when 
integrating on-premises software and cloud-based 
software services, vendors should consider adopting 
ESB instead of iPaaS if ESB and iPaaS can serve at the 
same integration level. In the following section, we 
explain this finding from the model and network effect 
perspectives, respectively.  
Compared to an integration using iPaaS, an integration 
using ESB enables the vendor to set a much higher 
price for the software product; this pricing is based on 
the extra network value that software product users 
gain from the software service. The vendor can also 
lower the price of the software service to enlarge the 
user base in order to better leverage the network effect 
of the software service. Moreover, the bundle price (if 
a bundle is an option) would be slightly higher when 
integration is conducted through ESB than through 
iPaaS. Therefore, through an ESB integration, the 
vendors can realize a higher demand for the software 
product and a slightly higher software-service and 
bundle demand (if a bundle is an option). Thus, in 
general, the vendor can realize higher profits when 
ESB integrates the software product and the service in 
an asymmetric manner; this represents a scenario in 
which software-product users can more efficiently 
enjoy network utility from a software service, but the 
opposite does not hold true. 
The underlying rationale can be understood as follows. 
If software-product users can more efficiently enjoy 
network value from the software service, then vendors 
would have an incentive to set a higher product price 
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because software-product users could gain higher 
value. Similarly, if software-service users can more 
efficiently enjoy network value from the software 
product, then vendors would have an incentive to set a 
higher service price. In our analysis, the key parameter 
of the per-user infrastructure cost of a software service 
plays a role. Even without the asymmetric-integration 
effect, the price of the software service exceeds the 
price of the software product because of the IT 
infrastructure cost for the cloud-service provision. If 
software-service users can more efficiently enjoy 
network value from the software product, then vendors 
could set a higher price for software service but in a 
medium increment. In contrast, if software product 
users can more efficiently enjoy network value from a 
software service, then vendors could set a higher price 
for the software product but in a large increment. The 
large price increment and the large product demand 
would lead to a higher profit increment. This 
phenomenon explains why vendors would realize 
higher profits when using ESB than when using iPaaS 
for integration. 
Result 3 can also be understood from a network-effect 
perspective. Generally, the overall network value from 
cloud-based software services would be higher than 
that from on-premises software because of the higher 
network-effect intensity: 𝛿𝑆 > 𝛿𝑃 . Thus, the vendor 
can improve the network value for software-product 
users by allowing them to indirectly gain network 
value from software services; this is essentially the 
case when ESB is adopted to integrate on-premises 
software and cloud-based software services. In this 
case, the overall network value from all users is higher 
for vendors. Thus, vendors can extract higher value 
and realize higher profits. 
5 Model Extension and Analysis 
In this section, we relax the assumption that the 
development costs of ESB and iPaaS are equal and 
consider the asymmetric structure between ESB and 
iPaaS. Depending on the complexity of the software 
design and implementation, the development costs of 
ESB could be higher or lower than those of iPaaS. In 
this scenario, with the other parameters kept the same, 
when we compare the optimal profit (already under the 
optimal bundling strategy) between iPaaS and ESB at 
the same integration level (i.e., 𝛽𝑃 = 𝛽𝑆), we find the 
following: 
Result 4: When integrating on-premises software 
and cloud-based software services at the same 
integration level, the vendor could realize higher 
profits by using ESB than by using iPaaS, under the 
following conditions: 
a) the development cost of ESB is lower 
than that of iPaaS; or 
b) the development cost of ESB is not 
significantly higher than that of iPaaS 
and the overall network effect is strong. 
The detailed numerical results supporting Result 4 can 
be found in Appendix C. Given that, when the 
development costs of ESB and iPaaS are the same (as 
in Result 3), it would be more profitable to integrate 
on-premises software and cloud-based software 
service through ESB than through iPaaS, it would be 
more profitable to integrate though ESB than through 
iPaaS when the development cost of ESB is lower, 
since vendors will be required to pay a higher 
development cost when using iPaaS. Thus, Result 4(a) 
is consistent with Result 3.  
When the development cost of ESB is higher than that 
of iPaaS, we find that it would still be more profitable 
to integrate on-premises software and cloud-based 
software service via ESB, especially when the 
development cost of ESB is not significantly higher 
than that of iPaaS and when the overall network effect 
is strong. In general, the higher the development cost 
of ESB, the lower the profit for vendors when 
integrating via ESB. Moreover, the higher the overall 
network effect, the higher the profit for vendors when 
integrating via ESB. The aggregate effect of the 
development costs and the overall network effect 
draws the boundary condition determining which 
integration method is more profitable. The slightly 
higher development cost of ESB and stronger overall 
network effect would make ESB a better choice for 
integration than iPaaS. Therefore, Result 4(b) is 
partially consistent with Result 3.  
6 Conclusions and Implications 
The integration of legacy software systems and cloud-
based software services has become a critical issue for 
firms seeking to generate a synergy value. Efforts have 
been made to design different integration methods, 
such as ESB and iPaaS. However, conflicts remain 
regarding when and how to use these methods 
appropriately. This study investigates the issue through 
economics modeling and a product bundling 
framework. 
We derived several interesting findings. First, we 
illustrate that, when using either an ESB or iPaaS to 
integrate on-premises software and a cloud-based 
software service, vendors can realize the highest profit 
by marketing both products separately. This benefit 
accrues because the integration effect would enhance 
the individual product’s utility by introducing additional 
network value from the other product. Such a rationale 
has been echoed in the software industry. For instance, 
SAP offers diverse integration solutions for integrating 
various software solutions and the integratable software 
solutions are separately offered instead of being offered 
in a special package (Nair, 2017). Furthermore, contrary 
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to the common perception that iPaaS offers better 
integration with the cloud, we find that vendors can 
realize higher profits by connecting a software product 
and a cloud service using ESB. Owing to ESB’s 
suitability for more complex integration and its higher 
efficiency in integrating cloud services with on-
premises software applications, vendors can 
significantly increase the value of software products 
and, eventually, the value of both the products.18 It must 
be noted that iPaaS does not excel at integrating 
complex applications.19 However, an integration using 
ESB can help vendors extract higher value from 
consumers and, eventually, realize higher profits. We 
acknowledge that this finding is derived under some 
critical assumptions. This article has considered the 
development costs of software applications and 
integration tools in a special function.  
Our work contributes to the existing literature in the 
areas of product bundling, network effect, and 
compatibility by considering the indirect network 
effect introduced by software integration. Following a 
traditional two-product bundling framework, we build 
an analytical model to capture the practical needs of 
vendors to integrate multiple software applications that 
differ in architecture, design, and implementation. The 
proposed stylized model could extend the current 
understanding of bundling decisions in the presence of 
the software-integration phenomenon, which is an 
emerging phenomenon in the cloud-computing era. 
Unlike prior literature, the pure component is the best 
strategy under this case. Additionally, on the basis of 
the proposed model, the optimal integration method 
has also been discussed from the vendors’ perspective. 
In the current scenario, several software applications 
work together. In this context, this study can have 
several important managerial implications. First, 
currently, in the software industry, vendors are moving 
to the cloud and using iPaaS as a way to fulfill their 
need for integration; however, our work suggests the 
opposite option—we find ESB to be a better option, at 
least from an economic viewpoint. In this case, the 
higher overall network value from the cloud software 
service acts as an influencing factor. Vendors can 
leverage a higher network value from the software 
service by integrating it with on-premises software 
applications and can realize higher profits by 
extracting more value from consumers. Second, given 
the connection between diverse software applications 
through integration tools, vendors may wish to market 
products and services separately rather than in a 
package. Eventually, this integration will improve the 
utility of the individual products. With a greater 
number of consumers valuing individual products, 
vendors will extract more profit by selling products 
separately. 
This work is not without limitations. First, for model 
conciseness, this work simplifies the assumption 
regarding development costs for software applications 
and integration tools. Owing to the assumption of the 
equal maximum utility of products in the product 
bundling framework, we assumed that the 
development costs of the software product and service 
are constant. It is assumed that the development costs 
of integration tools are linear functions with respect to 
their integration effects. These development costs 
might be specifically modeled in future research. 
Second, in prior bundling literature, the market size for 
both products is usually assumed to be equal. This 
article follows the same assumption. This tenet of the 
study might also be relaxed in future research. Third, 
similar to current bundling research, in this work, 
consumers are considered to have a jointly uniform 
distribution. We expect our key insights to hold when 
relaxing this assumption, but we leave this work to 
future research. Finally, this work and the existing 
bundling literature have not considered the impact of 
market competition on firms’ bundling decisions. This 
might be another direction to pursue in the future. 
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18  ESB can perform more complex integration due to its 
technological capability, and thus is more suitable for on-
premises software applications and legacy systems. ESB is 
suitable for vertical scalability—the integration of an 
enterprise’s complex internal systems and architectures. In 
contrast, iPaaS offers a more lightweight integration solution 
suitable for real-time applications in cloud-based services. 
iPaaS is more suitable for horizontal scalability—integration 
with third parties, partners, and other SaaS solutions. For 
details, please refer to https://dzone.com/articles/ipaas-vs-
esb-understanding-the-difference. 
19  https://www.networkworld.com/article/3064607/cloud-
computing/ipaas-what-this-cloud-technology-is-and-why-it-
s-important.html 
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Appendix A. Market Segmentation  
Given product prices, network effects, and levels of integration, the entire consumer market can be segmented into groups 
reflecting each selling strategy, using a comparison of the aggregate utilities for each selling option. Figure 2, Figure 3, and 
Figure 4 (in the main article) present market-segmentation cases for each of three selling strategies. These scenarios derive 
from a particular set of prices and parameters. Figure 2 shows four customer groups in PC, as follows: 
• Customers in the upper left region have high 𝑟𝑆  (𝑟𝑆 > 𝑝𝑆 − 𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃𝑑𝑃 − 𝛿𝑆𝑑𝑆 ) but low 𝑟𝑃  (𝑟𝑃 < 𝑝𝑃 − (1 −
𝛽
𝑃
)𝛿𝑃𝑑𝑃), and tend to buy only software services; 
• Customers in the lower right have low 𝑟𝑆 (𝑟𝑆 < 𝑝𝑆 − (1 − 𝛽𝑆)𝛿𝑆𝑑𝑆) but high 𝑟𝑃 (𝑟𝑃 > 𝑝𝑃 − 𝛿𝑃𝑑𝑃 − 𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆𝑑𝑆), and 
tend to buy only software products; 
• In the upper right are customers who like to buy software products and services because they have both high 𝑟𝑃 and 
high 𝑟𝑆; 
• In the lower left region are customers who would not buy anything because of their low 𝑟𝑃 and 𝑟𝑆. 
In the presence of network externality, customers gain higher utility and therefore have higher incentives to buy. Figure 2 
shows that, due to the presence of 𝛿𝑃, the line CF that designates the point at which customers are unable to commit to 
either buy a product or buy nothing, would shift to the left. Similarly, due to the presence of 𝛿𝑆, the line BE, at which 
customers cannot commit to either buying a service or buying nothing, would shift downward. Note that the integration 
effect, 𝛽
𝑃
 and 𝛽
𝑆
, from the integration tools serves to extend the movement of these lines, because new customers can also 
benefit from the indirect network utility of other products. The presence of 𝛽
𝑆
 would move line CF even further to the left 
and move line CD upward, reflecting that more consumers would buy a software product rather than both a software product 
and a service. Similarly, the presence of 𝛽
𝑃
 would shift line BE downward even further and move line AB to the right, 
reflecting that more consumers would buy a software service instead of both a software product and a service. 
Figure 3 shows that two groups of customers are in PB, as follows: 
• Customers in the upper right section who like to buy a bundle because they have higher aggregate utility, 𝑟𝑃 + 𝑟𝑆 >
𝑝
𝐵
− (𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵. 
• Customers in the lower left section who would choose to buy nothing. 
Despite the choice to purchase a product when exposed to a strategy of PC, consumers with high reservation utility for only 
one product but not another, would choose to purchase nothing under a PB strategy. The presence of 𝛿𝑃 and 𝛿𝑆 would shift 
line AB—the point at which customers are unable to commit to either buying a bundle or buying nothing—toward the 
lower-left corner. In PB, because customers are already buying both a software product and a service and benefit from the 
network utility correspondingly, the presence of 𝛽
𝑃
 and 𝛽
𝑆
 has no impact on market segmentation. 
Finally, in Figure 4, four groups of customers are in MB. In a similar manner to PC, the customers are grouped into four 
groups as follows: 
• Customers in the upper left region who only buy services, 
• Customers in lower right region who only buy products, 
• Customers in the upper-right section who would only buy bundles because of their higher aggregate utility. 
• Customers in the lower-left section who would not buy anything. 
MB combines the advantages of PC and PB by attracting consumers with a high utility for one software product or service 
over another, while attracting consumers with a higher aggregate utility for both a product and a service to buy the bundle. 
Because the presence of network externality leads to higher aggregate utility, more customers would choose to buy a product, 
service, and bundle. Thus, line CE—at which customers have no preference between buying a product and buying 
nothing—would shift toward the left. Line BF—the point characterizing customers’ indifference to either buying a service 
or not buying a service—would shift downward. Similarly, line BC—where customers cannot choose between buying a 
bundle and buying nothing—would shift toward the lower-left corner. 
Similarly, the integration effect 𝛽
𝑃
 and 𝛽
𝑆
 from integration tools serves to extend the movement of these lines, because 𝛽
𝑃
 
and 𝛽
𝑆
 would increase the individual product’s utility to a higher level. The presence of 𝛽
𝑆
 would move line CE even further 
to the left and move line CD upward, reflecting that more consumers would buy a software product instead of both a 
software product and a service. Similarly, the presence of 𝛽
𝑃
 would shift line BF downward even further and move line AB 
to the right, reflecting that more consumers would buy a service instead of a bundle.
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Appendix B. No Network Effects 
Omission of the network effect—𝛿𝑃 = 0, 𝛿𝑆 = 0, 𝛽𝑃 = 0 and 𝛽𝑆 = 0—may appear unrealistic in software-industry 
applications; however, it may be present in other circumstances where IT assets provide strong stand-alone utilities and 
weak collaborative features. For example, for those IT assets with high-performance computing capacity, consumers 
may only benefit from intrinsic utility, not network utility. The results of this simplified model confirm findings from 
Prasad, Venkatesh and Mahajan (2010). 
The closed-form solution for equilibria in price, demand, and profit in PC and PB can be analytically derived, as 
presented in Lemma B1: 
Lemma B1: The optimal prices, demands and profits for PC and PB are: 
 PC PB 
Prices 
𝑝𝑃
∗ =
1
2
 
𝑝𝑆
∗ =
1 + 𝑐
2
 
𝑝𝐵
∗ =
{
 
 𝑐 + √𝑐
2 + 6
3
, 0 < 𝑐 <
1
2
2 + 2𝑐
3
,
1
2
< 𝑐 < 1
 
Demands 
𝑑𝑃
∗ =
1
2
 
𝑑𝑆
∗ =
1 − 𝑐
2
 
𝑑𝐵
∗ =
{
 
 6 − 𝑐
2 − 𝑐√𝑐2 + 6
9
, 0 < 𝑐 <
1
2
2(2 − 𝑐)2
9
, 
1
2
< 𝑐 < 1
 
Profit 𝜋∗ =
1 + (1 − 𝑐)2
4
 𝜋
∗ = {
1
27
(𝑐3 − 18𝑐 + (𝑐2 + 6)
3
2) , 0 < 𝑐 <
1
2
2(2 − 𝑐)3
27
,
1
2
< 𝑐 < 1
 
 
Appendix D provides all proofs for this simplified model. Lemma B1 shows that in PC, while software product’s 
optimal price is independent of infrastructure cost, software service’s optimal price increases with higher infrastructure 
cost. In PB, the optimal price for a bundle increases with higher infrastructure cost. Also, 
Corollary B1: When infrastructure cost increases: 
1) the optimal profit decreases in both PC and PB, i.e., 
∂πPC
∗
∂c
< 0 and 
∂πPB
∗
∂c
< 0; 
2) the optimal profit decreases at a faster rate under PB than under PC, i.e., 
∂πPB
∗
∂c
<
∂πPC
∗
∂c
. 
Higher infrastructure costs translate to lower profit for PC and PB; however, under PC, a firm’s revenue from software 
products is not affected by infrastructure cost. Hence, although software services and bundles become less attractive, 
due to increasing prices as infrastructure costs increase, PB is more affected by an increase in infrastructure costs than 
PC. The result is consistent with current literature stating that low-cost goods are usually bundled, such as the bundle 
of information goods, while high-cost goods are usually offered separately (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1999). 
The next derivation is the optimal solution for MB. Lemma B2 shows the closed-form solutions for prices in MB, 
which prior literature has found insolvable: 
Lemma B2: The optimal prices for software product, service, and bundle in MB are: 
 
{
  
 
  
 𝑝
𝑃
∗ =
13
18
+
√12𝑐 + 1
9
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜉
𝑝
𝑆
∗ =
2 + 𝑐
3
𝑝
𝐵
∗ = −
12𝑐 + 1
27
𝑐𝑜𝑠2𝜉 −
(3𝑐 + 7)√12𝑐 + 1
27
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜉 +
30𝑐 − 13
108
 
in which 𝜉 =
1
3
{𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑠 [
27𝑐2+18𝑐+1
(12𝑐+1)3
] + 2𝜋}. 
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Based on optimal prices, the following results for the MB strategy are evident: 
Corollary B2: In MB, as infrastructure cost increases, 
1) software product prices decrease, i.e., 
∂pP
∗
∂c
< 0; 
2) the prices of software services and bundles increase, i.e., 
∂pS
∗
∂c
> 0 and 
∂pB
∗
∂c
> 0. 
In contrast to PC, the infrastructure cost not only affects prices for software services and bundles, but also the price of 
software products. When higher infrastructure cost leads to higher prices for software services and bundles, the 
software vendor is likely to set lower software-product prices to attract those consumers driven away by expensive 
services and bundles. Optimal prices would allow us to determine equilibrium demands and profits; however, due to 
the complexity of equilibrium prices, the sign for 
∂𝑑𝑃
∗
∂c
 , 
∂𝑑𝑆
∗
∂c
 , 
∂𝑑𝐵
∗
∂c
 , 
∂𝜋∗
∂c
 cannot be determined analytically. Through a 
numerical approach, it can be determined that the demand for product increases with infrastructure cost, but demand 
for service and bundle decreases with infrastructure cost. Total profit decreases with increasing infrastructure cost. 
Finally, by comparing PC, PB, and MB, we find: 
Proposition B1: (𝑝
𝑃
∗)
𝑀𝐵
> (𝑝
𝑃
∗)
𝑃𝐶
, (𝑝
𝑆
∗)
𝑀𝐵
> (𝑝
𝑆
∗)
𝑃𝐶
 and (𝑝
𝐵
∗ )
𝑀𝐵
> (𝑝
𝐵
∗ )
𝑃𝐵
. 
In mixed bundling, the vendor has discretion in price adjustment to extract more value from customers, and at the same 
time, set prices higher than those associated with pure strategies. 
Proposition B2: Mixed bundling is the most profitable selling strategy under any infrastructure cost. 
Proposition B2 is consistent with previous studies (Schmalensee, 1984; McAfee, McMillan & Whinston, 1989; 
Venkatesh & Mahajan, 2009; Bhargava, 2013). In general, PC attracts consumers whose utility is high for one product 
but not for the other. PB reduces consumer heterogeneity and attracts consumers who value both products. 
MB is optimal among the three selling plans because it captures the positive features of PC and of PB, thereby inducing 
consumers who value one product sufficiently highly to make a purchase, while at the same time attracting consumers 
who value both products. A company can set higher equilibrium prices for the two products plus the bundle in MB, 
when compared with using other selling strategies. Although the presence of the infrastructure cost of software service 
does not change the overall result, it leads the vendor to lower the price of the software product to offset the loss in 
profit due to the higher prices of the software service and bundle.
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Appendix C. Proofs for Main Article 
Proof of Lemma 1 
The general optimization problem is expressed as 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜋 = 𝑝𝑃𝑑𝑃 + (𝑝𝑆 − 𝑐)𝑑𝑆 
subject to: 0 < 𝑝𝑃 < 1 & 𝑐 < 𝑝𝑆 < 1 
When 𝛿𝑃𝑑𝑃 < 𝑝𝑃 < 1 , 𝑑𝑃 =
1−𝑝𝑃
1−𝛿𝑃
 , 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑝𝑃
=
1−2𝑝𝑃
1−𝛿𝑃
= 0 , 𝑝𝑃
∗ =
1
2
 . With 
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕𝑝𝑃
2 =
−2
1−𝛿𝑃
< 0 , this means 𝑝𝑃
∗ =
1
2
  is global 
optimal. 𝑑𝑃
∗ =
1
2(1−𝛿𝑃)
 can be obtained by substituting 𝑝𝑃
∗ . Finally, we check the constraint 𝛿𝑃𝑑𝑃 ≤ 𝑝𝑃   𝛿𝑃 ≤
1
2
. 
When 0 < 𝑝𝑃 ≤ 𝛿𝑃𝑑𝑃, 𝑑𝑃 = 1, 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑝𝑃
= 1 > 0, and 𝑝𝑃
∗ = 𝛿𝑃, which is the highest possible value. 
When 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝛿𝑆𝑑𝑆, 𝑐) ≤ 𝑝𝑆 < 1 , 𝑑𝑆 =
1−𝑝𝑆
1−𝛿𝑆
 , 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑝𝑆
=
1−2𝑝𝑆+𝑐
1−𝛿𝑆
= 0 , and 𝑝𝑆
∗ =
1+𝑐
2
 . Moreover, 
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕𝑝𝑆
2 =
−2
1−𝛿𝑆
< 0 , meaning 
𝑝𝑆
∗ =
1+𝑐
2
 is a global optimal in this case. Similarly, 𝑑𝑆
∗ =
1−𝑐
2(1−𝛿𝑆)
 can be obtained by substituting 𝑝𝑆
∗. By checking the 
constraint 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝛿𝑆𝑑𝑆, 𝑐) < 𝑝𝑆 < 1, we have 𝛿𝑆 ≤
1+𝑐
2
. 
When 𝑐 < 𝑝𝑆 < 𝛿𝑆, 𝑑𝑆 = 1. 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑝𝑆
= 1 > 0; itmeans 𝑝𝑆
∗ = 𝛿𝑆, which is the highest possible value. 
Finally, by substituting 𝑝𝑃
∗ , 𝑝𝑆
∗, 𝑑𝑃
∗ , and 𝑑𝑆
∗, we derive 𝜋∗, as in Lemma B3. By comparison with the optimal profit in 
Lemma 1, it can be concluded that network externality increases the software vendors’ optimal profit. 
Proof of Lemma 2 
Consumers will purchase the bundle when 𝑟𝑃 + 𝑟𝑆 + (𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵 − 𝑝𝐵 > 0. 
When 𝑝𝐵 − (𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵 > 1, 𝑑𝐵 =
1
2
(2 − 𝑝𝐵 + (𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵)
2, and 0 < 𝑑𝐵 <
1
2
. The bundle price can be written as 
𝑝𝐵 = (𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵 − √2√𝑑𝐵 + 2 . The profit function can be expressed in terms of 𝑑𝐵  as 𝜋 = [(𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵 −
√2√𝑑𝐵 + 2 − 𝑐]𝑑𝐵 . The first derivative condition 2(𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵 −
3√2
2
√𝑑𝐵 + 2 − 𝑐 = 0  gives √𝑑𝐵 =
3√2
2
∓√
9
2
−8(𝛿𝑃+𝛿𝑆)(2−𝑐)
4(𝛿𝑃+𝛿𝑆)
. The negative second derivative condition implies the selection of √𝑑𝐵 =
3√2
2
−√
9
2
−8(𝛿𝑃+𝛿𝑆)(2−𝑐)
4(𝛿𝑃+𝛿𝑆)
; 
therefore, 𝑑𝐵
∗ = (
3−√9−16(𝛿𝑃+𝛿𝑆)(2−𝑐)
4√2(𝛿𝑃+𝛿𝑆)
)
2
 . Taking the first derivative condition into consideration, 𝑝𝐵
∗ =
2+2𝑐−(𝛿𝑃+𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵
∗
3
=
2+2𝑐
3
−
(3−√9−16(𝛿𝑃+𝛿𝑆)(2−𝑐))
2
96(𝛿𝑃+𝛿𝑆)
. Substituting 𝑑𝐵
∗  into the condition 0 < 𝑑𝐵 <
1
2
 gives the result 𝛿𝑃 +
𝛿𝑆 < 𝑐 −
1
2
. 
When 0 < 𝑝𝐵 − (𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵 < 1, 𝑑𝐵 = 1 −
1
2
[𝑝𝐵 − (𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵]
2, and 
1
2
< 𝑑𝐵 < 1, the bundle price can be written 
as 𝑝𝐵 = (𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵 + √2(1 − 𝑑𝐵). The profit function is π = [(𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵 +√2(1 − 𝑑𝐵) − 𝑐]𝑑𝐵. For the profit 
function, the first derivative is taken with respect to 𝑑𝐵 , giving 2(𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝐵 +
2−3𝑑𝐵
√2(1−𝑑𝐵)
− 𝑐 = 0 . Denoting 
√2(1 − 𝑑𝐵) as 𝑥, the first derivative condition can be written as −(𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑥
3 +
3
2
𝑥2 + (2(𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆) − 𝑐)𝑥 − 1 = 0. 
The solutions of this cubic function are very complicated and proof is required that the solution exists. Denoting 
𝑓(𝑥) = −(𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆)𝑥
3 +
3
2
𝑥2 + (2(𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆) − 𝑐)𝑥 − 1 . 
1
2
< 𝑑𝐵 < 1   0 < √2(1 − 𝑑𝐵) < 1   0 < 𝑥 < 1 . 
𝑓(0) = −1 < 0. 𝑓(1) = (𝛿𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆) +
1
2
− 𝑐 > 0; therefore, there exists at least one solution in 
1
2
< 𝑑𝐵 < 1. 
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Additional Supporting Figures for Result 1 
Cases with medium low (e.g., 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟑) and extreme high (e.g., 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟗) infrastructure cost of software service are 
shown in Figure C1.  
  
𝑐 = 0.3 𝑐 = 0.9 
Figure C1. Optimal Strategy with Direct Network Externality in Model 1  
Proof of Lemma 3 
In seeking the interior equilibrium, the demand functions are {
𝑑𝑃 = 1 − 𝑝𝑃 + 𝛿𝑃𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑆 = 1 − 𝑝𝑆 + 𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃𝑑𝑃 + 𝛿𝑆𝑑𝑆
 , with {
0 < 𝑑𝑃 < 1
0 < 𝑑𝑆 < 1
 . 
Therefore, prices can be represented as {
𝑝𝑃 = 1 − (1 − 𝛿𝑃)𝑑𝑃
𝑝𝑆 = 1 + 𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃𝑑𝑃 − (1 − 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝑆
. Substituting prices into the profit function 
𝜋 = 𝑝𝑃𝑑𝑃 + (𝑝𝑆 − 𝑐)𝑑𝑆 and according to the first order condition gives {
−2(1 − 𝛿𝑃)𝑑𝑃 + 𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃𝑑𝑆 = −1
𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃𝑑𝑃 − 2(1 − 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝑆 = −1 + 𝑐
. Solving 
this equation system gives {
𝑑𝑃
∗ =
−𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃(1−𝑐)−2(1−𝛿𝑆)
𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)
𝑑𝑆
∗ =
−𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃−2(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝑐)
𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)
. Verification is now required for the conditions {
0 < 𝑑𝑃 < 1
0 < 𝑑𝑆 < 1
<
=> {
𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)+2(1−𝛿𝑆)
𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃
+ 1 < 𝑐 < 1
𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)+𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃
2(1−𝛿𝑃)
+ 1 < 𝑐 < 1
∩ 𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2 − 4(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝛿𝑆) < 0 . The two lower bounds for 𝑐 are 
denoted as 𝐵𝐿1 =
𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑠)+2(1−𝛿𝑆)
𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃
+ 1  and𝐵𝐿2 =
𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)+𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃
2(1−𝛿𝑃)
+ 1 . It is straightforward to 
verify that 𝐵𝐿1 < 𝐵𝐿2  when (2 + 𝛽𝑃)𝛿𝑃 < 1,  while 𝐵𝐿1 > 𝐵𝐿2  when (2 + 𝛽𝑃)𝛿𝑃 > 1 . Therefore, 
{
𝑑𝑃
∗ =
−𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃(1−𝑐)−2(1−𝛿𝑆)
𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)
𝑑𝑆
∗ =
−𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃−2(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝑐)
𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)
  when 𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2 − 4(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝛿𝑆) < 0 ∩  𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐵𝐿1 , 𝐵𝐿2) < 𝑐 < 1 . Substituting the 
demand, equilibrium prices can be derived as 
{
𝑝𝑃
∗ =
𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2−2(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)+𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝑐)
𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)
𝑝𝑆
∗ =
−𝛽𝑃𝛿𝑃(1−𝛿𝑆)−2(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)+[𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2−2(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)]𝑐
𝛽𝑃
2𝛿𝑃
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)
. 
A comparative analysis shows 
𝜕𝑝𝑃
∗
𝜕𝛽𝑃
< 0, 
𝜕𝑝𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛽𝑃
> 0, 
𝜕𝑑𝑃
∗
𝜕𝛽𝑃
> 0, 
𝜕𝑑𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛽𝑃
> 0. 
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Additional Supporting Figures for Result 2 
Cases with medium low (e.g., 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟑) and extreme high (e.g., 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟗) infrastructure cost of software service are 
shown in the following figures.  
  
𝑐 = 0.3 𝑐 = 0.9 
Figure C2. Optimal Strategy with 𝜷𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 in Model 2 
 
  
𝑐 = 0.3 𝑐 = 0.9 
Figure C3. Optimal Strategy with 𝜷𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 in Model 2 
 
  
𝑐 = 0.3 𝑐 = 0.9 
Figure C4. Optimal Strategy with 𝜷𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 in Model 2 
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Proof of Lemma 4 
In seeking the interior equilibrium, the demand functions are {
𝑑𝑃 = 1 − 𝑝𝑃 + 𝛿𝑃𝑑𝑃 + 𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆𝑑𝑆
𝑑𝑆 = 1 − 𝑝𝑆 + 𝛿𝑆𝑑𝑆
 , with {
0 < 𝑑𝑃 < 1
0 < 𝑑𝑆 < 1
 . 
Therefore, prices can be represented as {
𝑝𝑃 = 1 − (1 − 𝛿𝑃)𝑑𝑃 + 𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆𝑑𝑆
𝑝𝑆 = 1 − (1 − 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝑆
. Substituting prices into the profit function 
𝜋 = 𝑝𝑃𝑑𝑃 + (𝑝𝑆 − 𝑐)𝑑𝑆 and according to the first-order condition gives {
−2(1 − 𝛿𝑃)𝑑𝑃 + 𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆𝑑𝑆 = −1
𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆𝑑𝑃 − 2(1 − 𝛿𝑆)𝑑𝑆 = −1 + 𝑐
. Solving 
this equation system gives {
𝑑𝑃
∗ =
−𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆(1−𝑐)−2(1−𝛿𝑆)
𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)
𝑑𝑠
∗ =
−𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆−2(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝑐)
𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)
. Verification is now required for the conditions {
0 < 𝑑𝑃 < 1
0 < 𝑑𝑆 < 1
<=
> {
𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)+2(1−𝛿𝑆)
𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆
+ 1 < 𝑐 < 1
𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)+𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆
2(1−𝛿𝑃)
+ 1 < 𝑐 < 1
∩ 𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2 − 4(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝛿𝑆) < 0 . The two lower bounds for 𝑐  are 
denoted as 𝐵𝐿1 =
𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)+2(1−𝛿𝑆)
𝛽𝑠𝛿𝑆
+ 1 and𝐵𝐿2 =
𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)+𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆
2(1−𝛿𝑃)
+ 1. It is straightforward to verify 
that 𝐵𝐿1 < 𝐵𝐿2 when (2 + 𝛽𝑆)𝛿𝑆 < 1, while 𝐵𝐿1 > 𝐵𝐿2 when (2 + 𝛽𝑆)𝛿𝑆 > 1 . Therefore, {
𝑑𝑃
∗ =
−𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆(1−𝑐)−2(1−𝛿𝑆)
𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)
𝑑𝑆
∗ =
−𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆−2(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝑐)
𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)
 
when 𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2 − 4(1 − 𝛿𝑃)(1 − 𝛿𝑆) < 0 ∩  𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐵𝐿1, 𝐵𝐿2) < 𝑐 < 1 . Substituting the demand, the equilibrium prices 
can be derived as 
{
𝑝𝑃
∗ =
(1−𝛿𝑃)[−2(1−𝛿𝑆)−(1−𝑐)𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆]
𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)
𝑝𝑆
∗ =
𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2−2(1+𝑐)(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)+𝛽𝑆𝛿𝑆(1−𝛿𝑆)
𝛽𝑆
2𝛿𝑆
2−4(1−𝛿𝑃)(1−𝛿𝑆)
. 
A comparative analysis shows 
𝜕𝑝𝑃
∗
𝜕𝛽𝑆
> 0, 
𝜕𝑝𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛽𝑆
< 0, 
𝜕𝑑𝑃
∗
𝜕𝛽𝑆
> 0, 
𝜕𝑑𝑆
∗
𝜕𝛽𝑆
> 0. 
 
Additional Supporting Figures for Optimal Bundling Decisions in Model 3 
Cases with medium low (e.g., 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟑) and extreme high (e.g., 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟗) infrastructure cost of software service are 
show in the following figures.  
  
𝑐 = 0.3 𝑐 = 0.9 
Figure C5. Optimal Strategy with 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 in Model 3 
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𝑐 = 0.3 𝑐 = 0.9 
Figure C6. Optimal Strategy with 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 in Model 3 
 
  
𝑐 = 0.3 𝑐 = 0.9 
Figure C7. Optimal Strategy with 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 in Model 3 
 
Numerical Results for Result 3 
Extensive numerical analysis is performed under different sets of values of (𝑐, 𝛿𝑃, 𝛿𝑆, 𝛽𝑃, 𝛽𝑆) . Details about the 
difference between vendors’ profits when integrating via iPaaS and when integrating via ESB are shown in the 
following tables. Please be noted that some negative numbers are shown as 0.00 in Table C1 through Table C12 due to 
limits on display digits. 
Table C1. Equal Development Cost, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 and 𝒄 = 𝟎 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.15 -0.13 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.09 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.12 -0.10 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 0.00  
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.08 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.00   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00      
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𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 0.00 0.00 0.00        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.00 0.00         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.00 
 
        
 
Table C2. Equal Development Cost, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 and 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟑 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.13 -0.11 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 0.00  
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 0.00 0.00 -0.01        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.00 0.00         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.00 
 
        
 
Table C3. Equal Development Cost, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 and 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟔 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.09 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.00  
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.00 0.00         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.00 
 
        
 
Table C4. Equal Development Cost, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 and 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 
 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00   
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𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.00    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 0.00 0.00 0.00        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.00 0.00         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.00          
 
Table C5. Equal Development Cost, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 and 𝒄 = 𝟎 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 -0.30 -0.24 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.28 -0.28 -0.27 -0.28 -0.24 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.00  
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.22 -0.21 -0.20 -0.21 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.00   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 -0.16 -0.14 -0.13 -0.14 -0.12 -0.06 0.00    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 0.00     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 0.00 0.00 0.00        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.00 0.00         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.00 
 
        
 
Table C6. Equal Development Cost, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 and 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟑 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.34 -0.30 -0.24 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.25 -0.25 -0.24 -0.26 -0.24 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.00  
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.18 -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.00   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.12 -0.06 0.00    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.00     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.00 0.00         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.00 
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Table C7. Equal Development Cost, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 and 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟔 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.28 -0.28 -0.29 -0.33 -0.30 -0.24 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.21 -0.20 -0.21 -0.23 -0.24 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 
 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.14 -0.17 -0.12 -0.06 0.00   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 0.00    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.00     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.00 0.00         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.00          
 
Table C8. Equal Development Cost, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 and 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.23 -0.23 -0.25 -0.29 -0.29 -0.24 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.14 -0.15 -0.16 -0.18 -0.22 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 
 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.13 -0.09 -0.05 0.00   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 0.00    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 -0.01 -0.01 0.00        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.00 0.00         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.00          
 
Table C9. Equal Development Cost, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 and 𝒄 = 𝟎 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.57 -0.58 -0.58 -0.54 -0.45 -0.36 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.47 -0.49 -0.49 -0.45 -0.36 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 
 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.38 -0.39 -0.40 -0.35 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 -0.19 -0.18 -0.18 -0.17 -0.09 0.00     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 0.00      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00       
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Table C9. Equal Development Cost, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 and 𝒄 = 𝟎 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 0.00 0.00 0.00        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.00 0.00         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.00          
 
Table C10. Equal Development Cost, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 and 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟑 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.54 -0.57 -0.58 -0.54 -0.45 -0.36 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.44 -0.46 -0.48 -0.45 -0.36 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00  
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.34 -0.35 -0.37 -0.36 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 -0.24 -0.24 -0.25 -0.26 -0.18 -0.09 0.00    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 -0.14 -0.13 -0.14 -0.16 -0.09 0.00     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.00      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
 
      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 -0.01 -0.01         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.00          
 
Table C11. Equal Development Cost, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 and 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟔 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.51 -0.53 -0.56 -0.54 -0.45 -0.36 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.40 -0.42 -0.44 -0.45 -0.36 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 
 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.29 -0.30 -0.32 -0.35 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 -0.17 -0.18 -0.20 -0.23 -0.18 -0.09 0.00    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.12 -0.07 0.00     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 0.00      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 -0.01 -0.01         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.00          
 
Table C12. Equal Development Cost, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 and 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.45 -0.49 -0.51 -0.54 -0.45 -0.36 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.33 -0.36 -0.40 -0.42 -0.36 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 
 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.19 -0.23 -0.27 -0.29 -0.25 -0.18 -0.09 0.00   
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𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 -0.09 -0.11 -0.13 -0.14 -0.12 -0.07 0.00    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 0.00     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 -0.01 -0.01 0.00        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.00 0.00         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.00          
 
Numerical Results for Result 4 
Result 3 shows that it is more profitable to integrate via ESB than via iPaaS when the development costs of ESB and 
iPaaS are equal. Therefore, if the development cost of ESB is lower than that of iPaaS (e.g., 𝑘1 < 𝑘2), it is still more 
profitable to integrate via ESB than iPaaS, since vendors now have to pay higher development costs when using iPaaS. 
We turn to the numerical approach when considering the case where the development cost of ESB is higher than that 
of iPaaS. Extensive numerical analysis is performed under different sets of values of (𝑐, 𝛿𝑃, 𝛿𝑆, 𝛽𝑃, 𝛽𝑆, ∆𝑘 = 𝑘1 − 𝑘2). 
Details about the difference between when integrating via iPaaS and when integrating via ESB are shown in the 
following tables.  
As an illustrative example, we set  ∆𝑘 = 𝑘1 − 𝑘2 = 0.1 × 𝛽𝑃 = 0.1 × 𝛽𝑆. Similar patterns could be observed under 
other parameter values. Please note that some negative numbers are shown as 0.00 in Table C13 through Table C24 
because of limits on display digits. 
Table C13. 𝒌𝟏 − 𝒌𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟑, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 and 𝒄 = 𝟎 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.12 -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.03 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 0.03 
 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 0.03 0.03 0.03        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.03 0.03         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.03          
 
Table C14. 𝒌𝟏 − 𝒌𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟑, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 and 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟑 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.10 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.03 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.03 
 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03     
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
 
1543 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 0.03 0.03 0.02        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.03 0.03         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.03          
 
Table C15. 𝒌𝟏 − 𝒌𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟑, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 and 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟔 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.03 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.03  
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 0.02 0.02 0.02        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.03 0.03         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.03          
 
Table C16. 𝒌𝟏 − 𝒌𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟑, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 and 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 0.03 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03  
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 0.03 0.03 0.03        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.03 0.03         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.03          
 
Table C17. 𝒌𝟏 − 𝒌𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟔, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 and 𝒄 = 𝟎 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.24 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 0.06 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.22 -0.22 -0.21 -0.22 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 0.06  
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𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.16 -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 0.06   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 -0.10 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 0.00 0.06    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 0.06 0.06 0.06        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.06 0.06         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.06          
 
Table C18. 𝒌𝟏 − 𝒌𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟔, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 and 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟑 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.28 -0.24 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 0.06 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.19 -0.19 -0.18 -0.20 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 0.06  
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 0.06   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.00 0.06    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.06     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 0.05 0.05 0.05        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.06 0.06         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.06          
 
Table C19. 𝒌𝟏 − 𝒌𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟔, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 and 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟔 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.22 -0.22 -0.23 -0.27 -0.24 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 0.06 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 -0.17 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 0.06 
 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 -0.11 -0.06 0.00 0.06   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.06    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.06     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 0.05 0.05 0.05        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.06 0.06         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.06          
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Table C20. 𝒌𝟏 − 𝒌𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟔, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 and 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.17 -0.17 -0.19 -0.23 -0.23 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 0.06 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.12 -0.16 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 0.06 
 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.06   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.06    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 0.05 0.05 0.06        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.06 0.06         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.06          
 
Table C21. 𝒌𝟏 − 𝒌𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟗, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 and 𝒄 = 𝟎 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.48 -0.49 -0.49 -0.45 -0.36 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 0.09 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.38 -0.40 -0.40 -0.36 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 0.09  
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.29 -0.30 -0.31 -0.26 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 0.09   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 0.09    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 0.00 0.09     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.09      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 0.09 0.09 0.09        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.09 0.09         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.09          
 
Table C22. 𝒌𝟏 − 𝒌𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟗, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 and 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟑 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.45 -0.48 -0.49 -0.45 -0.36 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 0.09 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.35 -0.37 -0.39 -0.36 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 0.09 
 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.25 -0.26 -0.28 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 0.09   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 -0.15 -0.15 -0.16 -0.17 -0.09 0.00 0.09    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 0.00 0.09     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.09      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 0.08 0.08 0.07        
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𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.08 0.08         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.09          
 
Table C23. 𝒌𝟏 − 𝒌𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟗, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 and 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟔 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.42 -0.44 -0.47 -0.45 -0.36 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 0.09 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.31 -0.33 -0.35 -0.36 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 0.09 
 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.20 -0.21 -0.23 -0.26 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 0.09   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 -0.08 -0.09 -0.11 -0.14 -0.09 0.00 0.09    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.09     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.09      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 0.07 0.07 0.08        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.08 0.08         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.09          
 
Table C24. 𝒌𝟏 − 𝒌𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟗, 𝜷𝑷 = 𝜷𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 and 𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟏 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟐 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟑 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟒 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟓 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟔 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟕 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟖 𝜹𝑺 = 𝟎. 𝟗 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟗 -0.36 -0.40 -0.42 -0.45 -0.36 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 0.09 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟖 -0.24 -0.27 -0.31 -0.33 -0.27 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 0.09 
 
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟕 -0.10 -0.14 -0.18 -0.20 -0.16 -0.09 0.00 0.09   
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟔 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.09    
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟓 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.09     
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟒 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09      
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟑 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09       
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟐 0.08 0.08 0.09        
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎. 𝟏 0.09 0.09         
𝜹𝑷 = 𝟎 0.09          
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Appendix D. Proofs for Appendix B 
Proof of Lemma B1 
For PC, the first-order condition results in 𝑝
𝑃
∗ =
1
2
 and 𝑝
𝑆
∗ =
1+𝑐
2
 . They already satisfy constraints. Straightforward 
derivations are to have optimal demands 𝑑𝑃
∗ =
1
2
 , 𝑑𝑆
∗ =
1−𝑐
2
 and optimal profit 𝜋∗ =
1+(1−𝑐)2
4
 when substituting optimal 
prices. 
For PB, 𝑑𝐵 = {
1 −
1
2
𝑝
𝐵
2 , 𝑐 < 𝑝
𝐵
< 1
1
2
(2 − 𝑝
𝐵
)
2
, 1 < 𝑝
𝐵
< 2
. When 𝑐 < 𝑝𝐵 < 1, according to the first-order condition 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑝𝐵
= 1 −
3
2
𝑝
𝐵
2 +
𝑐𝑝
𝐵
= 0, we have 𝑝
𝐵
∗ =
𝑐+√𝑐2+6
3
. Another root 𝑝
𝐵
=
𝑐−√𝑐2+6
3
 can be removed because it is negative. A straightforward 
verification is that 𝑐 < 𝑝𝐵
∗ =
𝑐+√𝑐2+6
3
< 1 when 0 < 𝑐 <
1
2
. When 1 < 𝑝𝐵 < 2, according to the first-order condition 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑝𝐵
=
1
2
(2 − 𝑝
𝐵
)(2 + 2𝑐 − 3𝑝
𝐵
) = 0, we have 𝑝
𝐵
∗ =
2+2𝑐
3
. Another root 𝑝
𝐵
= 2 can be ignored. It’s easy to verify 
that 1 < 𝑝𝐵
∗ =
2+2𝑐
3
< 2 when 
1
2
< 𝑐 < 1. By the substitution of 𝑝
𝐵
∗ , we can obtain 𝑑𝐵
∗  and 𝜋∗. 
To summarize: 
When 0 < 𝑐 <
1
2
, 𝑝
𝐵
∗ =
𝑐+√𝑐2+6
3
, 𝑑𝐵
∗ =
6−𝑐2−𝑐√𝑐2+6
9
 and 𝜋∗ =
1
27
(𝑐3 − 18𝑐 + (𝑐2 + 6)
3
2); 
When 
1
2
< 𝑐 < 1, 𝑝
𝐵
∗ =
2+2𝑐
3
, 𝑑𝐵
∗ =
2(2−𝑐)2
9
, 𝜋∗ =
2(2−𝑐)3
27
. 
For PC, we also have 
𝜕𝑝𝑃
∗
𝜕𝑐
= 0 ,
𝜕𝑝𝑆
∗
𝜕𝑐
=
1
2
> 0 , 
𝜕𝑑𝑃
∗
𝜕𝑐
= 0 , 
𝜕𝑑𝑆
∗
𝜕𝑐
= −
1
2
< 0  and  
𝜕𝜋∗
𝜕𝑐
=
𝑐−1
2
< 0. 
For PB, 
𝜕𝑝𝐵
∗
𝜕𝑐
= {
1+
𝑐
√𝑐2+6
3
, 0 < 𝑐 <
1
2
2
3
,
1
2
< 𝑐 < 1
 , therefore, 
𝜕𝑝𝐵
∗
𝜕𝑐
> 0 . 
𝜕𝑑𝐵
∗
𝜕𝑐
= {
−2𝑐−√𝑐2+6−
𝑐2
√𝑐2+6
9
, 0 < 𝑐 <
1
2
4(𝑐−2)
9
,  
1
2
< 𝑐 < 1
 , therefore, 
𝜕𝑑𝐵
∗
𝜕𝑐
< 0 . 
𝜕𝜋∗
𝜕𝑐
= {
1
27√𝑐2+6
((3𝑐2 − 18)√𝑐2 + 6 + 3𝑐) , 0 < 𝑐 <
1
2
−
2(2−𝑐)2
9
,
1
2
< 𝑐 < 1
, therefore, 
𝜕𝜋∗
𝜕𝑐
< 0. 
Proof of Corollary B1 
It is already known that 
𝜕𝜋𝑃𝐶
∗
𝜕𝑐
< 0 and 
𝜕𝜋𝑃𝐵
∗
𝜕𝑐
< 0. It is required to demonstrate that 
𝜕𝜋𝑃𝐵
∗
𝜕𝑐
<
𝜕𝜋𝑃𝐶
∗
𝜕𝑐
 because 
𝜕𝜋𝑃𝐶
∗
𝜕𝑐
 and 
𝜕𝜋𝑃𝐵
∗
𝜕𝑐
 are 
negative. When 
1
2
< 𝑐 < 1, showing that 
𝜕𝜋𝑃𝐵
∗
𝜕𝑐
<
𝜕𝜋𝑃𝐶
∗
𝜕𝑐
 is equivalent to showing that −
2(2−𝑐)2
9
<
𝑐−1
2
, which is essentially 
the same as (𝑐 −
7
8
)
2
+
63
64
> 0 . When 0 < 𝑐 <
1
2
 , denotes 𝑓(𝑐) =
1
27√𝑐2+6
((3𝑐2 − 18)√𝑐2 + 6 + 3𝑐) and 𝑔(𝑐) =
𝑐−1
2
 it is straightforward to observe that both 𝑓(𝑐) and 𝑔(𝑐) increase as 𝑐 ∈ (0,
1
2
). Through simple calculation, 𝑓
𝑚𝑎𝑥
=
𝑓 (
1
2
) = −
37
60
, 𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛
= 𝑔(0) = −
1
2
 and 𝑓
𝑚𝑎𝑥
< 𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛
. Therefore 
𝜕𝜋𝑃𝐵
∗
𝜕𝑐
<
𝜕𝜋𝑃𝐶
∗
𝜕𝑐
 for 0 < 𝑐 <
1
2
. 
Proof of Lemma B2 
For the profit function, the first-order condition leads to 𝑝
𝑆
∗ =
2+𝑐
3
. 𝑝
𝑃
 and 𝑝
𝐵
 satisfy the following system of quadratic 
equations: 
{
3𝑝
𝑃
2 − (2 + 3𝑝
𝐵
− 𝑐)𝑝
𝑃
+ 2𝑝
𝐵
− 𝑐 = 0
3𝑝
𝐵
2 − 3𝑝
𝑃
2 + 4𝑝
𝑃
− (8 + 2𝑐)𝑝
𝐵
+
1
3
(2 + 𝑐)2 + 2 + 𝑐 = 0
 
Integration of On-Premises and Cloud-Based Software 
 
1548 
𝑝
𝐵
 can be expressed in terms of 𝑝
𝑃
 as 𝑝
𝐵
=
(1−𝑝𝑃)𝑐
2−3𝑝𝑃
+ 𝑝
𝑃
 with 𝑝
𝑃
≠
2
3
 . Through substitution, the above system of 
equations can be transformed into a cubic equation about 𝑝
𝑃
 as 3 [
(1−𝑝𝑃)𝑐
2−3𝑝𝑃
−
2+𝑐
3
]
2
− 4𝑝𝑃 + 2 = 0 with 𝑝𝑃 >
1
2
. This 
equation can be further transformed into 𝑝
𝑃
3 −
13
6
𝑝
𝑃
2 +
14−𝑐
9
𝑝
𝑃
−
𝑐2−8𝑐−40
108
= 0 with constraints including 𝑝
𝑃
≠
2
3
, 𝑝
𝑃
>
1
2
 and other constraints shown in Figure D1. 
The first step is to simplify these constraints. Because 𝑝
𝐵
=
(1−𝑝𝑃)𝑐
2−3𝑝𝑃
+ 𝑝
𝑃
 , the constraint 𝑝
𝑃
< 𝑝
𝐵
 is equivalent to 
(1 − 𝑝
𝑃
)(2 − 3𝑝
𝐵
) > 0 and is ultimately equivalent to 0 < 𝑝𝑃 <
2
3
. It is straightforward to verify that 𝑐 < 𝑝𝑆 < 1 
since 𝑝
𝑆
=
𝑐+2
3
 and 0 < 𝑐 < 1. 𝑝
𝑆
< 𝑝
𝐵
 is equivalent to 
𝑐+2
3
<
(1−𝑝𝑃)𝑐
2−3𝑝𝑃
+ 𝑝
𝑃
, and finally equivalent to 𝑝
𝑃
>
2−√𝑐
3
. 𝑝
𝐵
<
𝑝
𝑃
+ 𝑝
𝑆
 is equivalent to 𝑝
𝑃
<
4−𝑐
6
. The constraint set can therefore be simplified as 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (
1
2
,
2−√𝑐
3
) < 𝑝𝑃 <
4−𝑐
6
. This 
cubic equation is now analytically resolved. Denoting the coefficients as 𝐴 = 1 , 𝐵 = −
13
6
 , 𝐶 =
14−𝑐
9
  and 𝐷 =
−
𝑐2−8𝑐−40
108
, the discriminant is 𝛥 = (
−𝐵3
27𝐴3
+
−𝐷
2𝐴
+
𝐵𝐶
6𝐴2
)
2
+ (
𝐶
3𝐴
−
𝐵2
9𝐴2
)
3
= 𝛼2 + µ3. Using 𝛼 =
27𝑐2+18𝑐+1
5832
, µ = −
12𝑐+1
324
 
and finally 𝛥 =
𝑐2[(𝑐−
14
27
)
2
−
250
729
]
46656
, verification as whether Δ is positive or negative is required. Let 𝑦 = (𝑐 −
14
27
)
2
−
250
729
. 
𝑦
𝑚𝑎𝑥
=
196−250
729
< 0 when 𝑐 = 0 , therefore 𝛥 < 0 for 𝑐 ∈ (0,1) . There are three distinct real roots for this cubic 
equation. Denoting 𝛾 =
𝛼
(−µ)
3
2
=
27𝑐2+18𝑐+1
(12𝑐+1)
3
2
, the three distinct real roots are 𝑝
𝑃(𝑖) =
13
18
+
√12𝑐+1
9
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2,3, where 
𝜃1 =
𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑠𝛾
3
, 𝜃2 =
𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑠𝛾+2𝜋
3
 and 𝜃3 =
𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑠𝛾−2𝜋
3
. Confirmation is now required that these real roots 𝑝
𝑃(𝑖), 𝑖 = 1,2,3 
satisfy the constraint 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (
1
2
,
2−√𝑐
3
) < 𝑝𝑃 <
4−𝑐
6
. Numerical proof is obtained that 𝑝
𝑃(2) is the only real root satisfying 
all constraints using Figure D1. 
 
 
Figure D1. Real Roots and Constraints 
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Finally, the optimal prices in MB are: 
{
  
 
  
 𝑝
𝑃
∗ =
13
18
+
√12𝑐 + 1
9
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜉
𝑝
𝑆
∗ =
2 + 𝑐
3
𝑝
𝐵
∗ = −
12𝑐 + 1
27
𝑐𝑜𝑠2𝜉 −
(3𝑐 + 7)√12𝑐 + 1
27
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜉 +
30𝑐 − 13
108
 
In which 𝜉 =
1
3
{𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑠 [
27𝑐2+18𝑐+1
(12𝑐+1)3
] + 2𝜋}. 
Proof of Corollary B2 
We can verify that 𝜉 ∈ [
2𝜋
3
, 𝜋] , 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜉 < 0  and 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜉 > 0 . So, 
𝜕𝑝𝑃
∗
𝜕𝑐
  is negative, since 
𝜕𝑝𝑃
∗
𝜕𝑐
=
2𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜉
3√12𝑐+1
−
2√12𝑐+1
3(12𝑐+1)6
𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜉
(18𝑐2+21𝑐+1)(12𝑐+1)2
√1−[
27𝑐2+18𝑐+1
(12𝑐+1)3
]
2
< 0 . Also, 
𝜕𝑝𝑆
∗
𝜕𝑐
=
1
3
> 0 . From 𝑝
𝐵
=
(1−𝑝𝑃)𝑐
2−3𝑝𝑃
+ 𝑝
𝑃
 , we have 
𝜕𝑝𝐵
∗
𝜕𝑐
=
(1−𝑝𝑃
∗ )(2−3𝑝𝑃
∗ )+[(3𝑝𝑃
∗−2)
2
−𝑐]
𝜕𝑝𝑃
∗
𝜕𝑐
(2−3𝑝𝑃)
2  . We can show that (3𝑝𝑃
∗ − 2)
2
− 𝑐 < 0  for 0 < 𝑐 < 1 . Considering 
𝜕𝑝𝑃
∗
𝜕𝑐
< 0 , (1 −
𝑝
𝑃
∗)(2 − 3𝑝
𝑃
∗) > 0, we can conclude that 
𝜕𝑝𝐵
∗
𝜕𝑐
> 0. 
Proof of Proposition B1 
The formulae for equilibrium prices in MB are lengthy. For this reason, the results are presented numerically in Figure 
D2. 
 
 
Figure D2. Comparison of Equilibrium Prices in Each Selling Strategy 
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Proof of Proposition B2 
The formulae involved in comparing profit equations for each selling plan are lengthy, especially the profit equation 
of MB. Lengthy equations add little to the insights and implications of the results of this study; therefore, we adopted 
numerical simulation in this case, as shown in Figure D3. 
 
 
Figure D3. Optimal Strategy in the Absence of Network Effect 
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